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CONFLICT AND BALANCE AMONG ASEAN COUNTRIES:
GEOPOLITICS AND SECURITY ISSUES
Akihito Y onekura, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1996
This paper examines the changing geopolitical scene in Southeast Asia and
regional security issues managed by the states belonging to the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). A crucial research question is "How has the end
of the Cold War influenced the security perspectives of these nations?"
Historical research of the political cultures and complex ethnicities of the
ASEAN countries shows causes of awkward relationships (originating in the colonial
era) between them.

For managing regional security issues, these countries have

established several regional organizations, although most of them have failed. The
withdrawal of the British and U.S. forces from Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and
Vietnam during the early 1970s increased the need for self-protection by the ASEAN
countries. These countries, threatened by communist Vietnam, promoted regional
cooperation through ASEAN and mutual suspicion decreased.
This paper also shows recently increasing conventional military power and
military ties among t_he ASEAN countries. The changing inventory of weaponry and
defense expenditures show that arms build-up has been carefully controlled so as not to
create an arms race in this region.

Moreover, the emerging Chinese threat has

encouraged these countries to sustain political and military ties since the end of the Cold
War.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
ASEAN and Its Member Countries
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional
organization in Southeast Asia. The organization was established by Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand in 1967, with the original purpose
of regional cooperation in economic, social, and cultural areas. Brunei joined ASEAN
in 1984. ASEAN admitted Vietnam as its seventh member in 1995. Although ASEAN
was established to negotiate nonpolitical issues among the member countries, regional
security issues have been the special focus of many ASEAN meetings.
Geopolitical Change and the ASEAN Countries
The ASEAN countries, except Thailand, were newly independent nation-states
that became independent after World War II. By the time imperial powers colonized
Southeast Asia after the sixteenth century, only the Thais and Viets had formed
monarchies in this region. Portugal and Spain extended their power in Southeast Asia
during the sixteenth century as the first step of colonization in this region. The
Portuguese occupied and established a fortress in Malacca, a city of the Southern Malay
Peninsula, to manage trade of condiments in 1511. Spanish troops landed on Cebu
Island of the Philippines in 1565 and established a trade base in Manila. They used the
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Manila base as a station of trade between China and Europe, known as the Galleon
trade.
The Netherlands and Britain expanded their colonial power in Southeast Asia to
replace declining Portugal during the seventeenth century. The Dutch troops defeated
the Portuguese stationed at the fortress of Malacca in 1641. The Dutch colonial
government succeeded in putting East India (Indonesia) under their control by the early
eighteenth century. Britain occupied Pinang Island, in the Strait of Malacca, and
Singapore Island as trade bases in 1786 and 1819. Britain and the Netherlands
concluded the Anglo-Dutch treaty in 1824 and British Malaya was established in the
Southern Malay Peninsula. France also invaded the monarchy of Vietnam in 1858 and
colonized Indochina's three countries, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. These European
colonial powers developed mineral mines and plantations in their colonies.
Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain drew boundaries and
divided the diverse ethnic groups in Southeast Asia by the end of the eighteenth
century. As a result, multiethnic colonies were formed. In addition, colonial powers
needed ample labor forces to develop mines and plantations. Foreign Chinese and
Indians came to these colonies as laborers. These immigrants accelerated social
fragmentation and little communication existed between the ethnic groups.
Independence movements arose in each of the large ethnic groups such as the Malays
and Chinese within their colonies. However, these separate movements did not cross
ethnic boundaries, and so lacked sufficient power to gain their independence.
Japanese Imperial Forces attacked Pearl Harbor in Hawaii in 1941, precipitating
World War II in the Pacific area. The Japanese Navy brought most of Southeast Asia
under Japanese control within a few months after the Pearl Harbor attack. The extreme
cruelty of the Japanese occupation, especially that inflicted on the immigrant Chinese,
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caused a rise in resistance movements, notably the growth and expansion of guerrilla
activities. Internally, the Japanese occupation stimulated Malay nationalism and, in
some instances, Japan was able to enlist the services of the indigenous community that
was determined to end the European presence in the region.
The Japanese surrender in 1945, therefore, provoked the inhabitants of
Southeast Asia to oppose recolonization of their lands by European powers.
Indonesians and Vietnamese declared their independence and fought to free themselves
from the Netherlands and France. East Indians defeated the Dutch troops in 1949.
Indonesia became a sovereign state. Britain, however, freely yielded control of its
colonies in this region and prepared them for self-government. France lost control of
Indochina in 1954; in 1957, Malaya peacefully gained its freedom as the Federation of
Malaya.
The termination of imperial rule in Southeast Asia and the creation of new
independent states, however, did not bring stability to Southeast Asia. Complex ethnic
distribution produced ethnic and territorial conflicts among these newly independent
countries. Especially, the formation of Malaysia caused disputes with Indonesia and
the Philippines in the 1960s. Malaysia was formed by combining the Federation of
Malaya and the former British colonies, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore in 1963.
Brunei rejected being a part of Malaysia. In addition, Singapore separated from
Malaysia in 1965 because of internal ethnic conflicts between Chinese and Malays.
Multiethnic societies with artificial political boundaries caused internal and external
conflicts within and between these countries. Any country in this region was a latent
opponent to neighboring countries.
Most of the countries in the world were categorized into two blocs-- the capitalist
bloc or the communist bloc-- during the Cold War era. The capitalist bloc centered on
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the United States, and the communist bloc centered on the Soviet Union.
The Vietnamese war for independence from French control produced a war
between the communist and capitalist blocs. The Viet Minh, a communist Vietnamese
guerrilla force, defeated the French forces in 1954. Five powers, Britain, China,
France, the United States, and the Soviet Union, held a meeting to negotiate the
independence of Vietnam in Geneva. However, the United States insisted on the
partition of Vietnam. Two governments were established: the North of the 17th
parallel, the communist, and another in the South sponsored by the Americans. The
Viet Minh accepted the settlement reluctantly under pressure from the Soviet Union and
China, who were espousing a policy of peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries at
the time. Moreover, it was agreed their plebiscite would be conducted in 1956 to
determine which of the two governments would unify the country. The South
Vietnamese government formed strong anti-communist policies and resisted communist
Vietnam. They also refused to hold the plebiscite and the North Vietnamese
government gave up peaceful unification of Vietnam, and formed the South Vietnam
National Liberation Front (NLF) to fight for unification. The Soviet Union and China
supported North Vietnam and communist guerrilla forces that engaged in combat in
capitalist Vietnam. Similarly, the American government helped "friendly forces" and
the Diem regime of South Vietnam. The U.S. forces directly intervened in the war in
South Vietnam in 1965 and fought against the communist guerrilla forces.
Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand were also threatened by communist
guerrilla activities in their territories and needed a regional security system to oppose
them. These three counties established the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in
1961. It was the first regional organization formed by the Southeast Asian countries.
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However, ASA was paralyzed by a territorial dispute between Malaya and the
Philippines soon after its establishment.
The independence issue of Malaysia stimulated Malay nationalism in Indonesia
during the early 1960s. Maphilindo was formed by Malay oriented countries,
Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines in 1963. These countries tried to solve the
Malaysian dispute through the organization. However, Maphilindo collapsed after
Malaysia became independent that year.
Even after the collapse of ASA and Maphilindo, Southeast Asian countries
continued to consider establishing a regional security framework which would keep its
distance from both Western and Eastern blocs during the escalation of the war in
Indochina. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand declared the
establishment of the Association of South East Asian Nations in 1967. ASEAN was an
association of anticommunist countries in Southeast Asia but the members asserted that
ASEAN was an economic, social and cultural community so as not to anger the Eastern
bloc countries. Although the ASEAN countries still had conflicts with each other, they
cooperated in opposing Chinese or Vietnamese threats. After the Vietnam War, the
communization of the three Indochinese countries in 1975 and the Vietnamese invasion
of Cambodia in 1978 led the ASEAN countries to rally against the troops stationed in
Cambodia during the 1980s.
However, the ideological conflicts between the Eastern and Western blocs began
to collapse after the end of the 1980s. Vietnam forces lost Soviet support and
announced their withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989. Moreover, the Soviet Union
divided into fifteen nations in December 1991. Russia became a more cooperative with
the United States.

Although Vietnam kept its communist regime, it did not

ideologically conflict with neighboring countries as much as it had during the previous
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few decades. Significantly, Vietnam, previously an opponent of the ASEAN countries,
joined ASEAN in August 1995.
Even after the ASEAN countries lost their common threat, Vietnam, they
continued to build up their armed forces. After the dominant Russian and U.S. forces
withdrew from Vietnam and the Philippines, this region became the world's biggest
weapon market (Takashima, 1992). Some observers were concerned about a
possibility of significant arms races among the ASEAN countries after the Cold War
(Stockholm lnternational Peace Research Institute,1994, & International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1994).
After the Cold War
A rising debate is whether the end of the Cold War has produced peaceful
conditions. John J. Mearsheimer (1990) analyzes the effect of the end of the Cold War
on the prospects for peace in Europe. According to him, the past 45 years represented
the longest period of peace in European history. He mentions three reasons for the
long peace: (1) bipolar distribution of power in this region, (2) rough equality in
military power between the two polar states, and (3) fear of nuclear war. According to
Mearsheimer, multipolarity and the imbalance of power were the crucial conditions that
created instability in Europe before the Cold War. He states that the balance of massive
Soviet and American military power suppressed rising nationalism during the Cold War
era. The transformation of Europe from a bipolar to a multipolar system revitalized
British, French, and German nationalism, thus undermining stability in Europe. For
example, far right activists and parties increased their political power in this region.
Their xenophobic movements encouraged hatred or fear of other nationalities.
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Rising nationalism has also caused serious wars and civil wars in the former
Eastern bloc.

Peter Wallensteen and Karin Axell (1994) have observed current

conflicts in Europe. Their observations show evidence of instability after the Cold
War. Table 1 shows an increasing number of conflicts in the European region between
1989 and 1993. Most of the conflicts were recorded in Eastern Europe, the former
Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. Ethnic nationalism, formerly repressed by
totalitarian governments, arose after the end of the Cold War. Wallensteen and Axell
state that "the end of the Cold War generated a set of new conflicts" (p. 336).
Table 1
Number of Armed Conflicts in Europe by Level of Activity and Year
Minor Armed Conflictsl
Intermediate Armed Conflicts2
War3
All Armed Conflicts

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1
1
2

1
0
3

1
1
6

2
2
9

2
4
10

0

2

4

5

4

1. Minor armed conflicts, where the battle related deaths during the course of the
conflict are below 1000;
2. Intermediate conflicts, where there are more than 1000 battle-related deaths recorded
during the course of the conflict, and where 25 but less than 1000 deaths have
occurred during a particular year;
3. Wars, where there are more than 1000 battle related deaths during one particular
year.
Source: Wallensteen, P., & Axell, K. (1994). Conflict resolution and the end of the
Cold War. Journal of Peace Research, 31, p. 335.
The end of the Cold War has also influenced geopolitics in Southeast Asia. The
question arises: did possibilities of armed conflict increase in Southeast Asia after the
Cold.War as did the conflicts in Europe? Ganesan N. (1995), a professor at the
National University of Singapore, points to "the escalation of bilateral tensions among
Southeast Asian States" after the Cold War (p. 218). ASEAN faced the Vietnamese
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threat through Thailand during the 1980s. Thailand, next to Cambodia which Was
occupied by Vietnamese troops, was supported by the ASEAN countries. The member
countries maintained cooperation and produced coherent anti-Vietnam policies.
However, according to Gan�san, in 1995, Thailand became the economic center in
Indochina and strengthened its economic ties with Vietnam. Moreover, he expects
member countries to decrease their unity with each other and for conflicts with
neighboring countries to escalate.
Hypothesis
The withdrawal of colonial powers after the end of World War II caused
conflicts leading to the formation of nation-states in Southeast Asia. Traditionally, the
ASEAN countries maintained tension with each other. New regional conditions after
the Cold War brought instability to the European region. Did geopolitical change
caused by the end of the Cold War also drive instability in Southeast Asia? The
hypothesis in this thesis is the build up of armed forces among the ASEAN member
countries predicts an increase in their conflicts with other member countries after the
Cold War.
Design of This Research Study
An Analysis
This study mainly consists of a historical event analysis of regional stability
through regional organizations and their member countries in the changing Southeast
Asian geopolitics. The paper also examines the recently increasing inventory of
weaponry and defense expenditures among the ASEAN countries.
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Political Culture of the ASEAN Countries
The A SEAN countries have few similarities. For example, Indonesia covers
735,268 square miles; while Singapore, at 600 square miles, is smaller than New York
City. Approximately 195 million people live in Indonesia. In contrast, the population
of Brunei is only 369,000. The gross domestic product per capita in Singapore is
$13,900 but only $230 in Vietnam. In the Philippines, 83% of the citizens are Roman
Catholic. In Thailand, 95% of the citizens are Buddhists, and 88% of Indonesians are
Moslem (Famighetti, 1993).
Boundaries of the ASEAN countries drawn during the colonial era exacerbated
social and ethnic diversity in the member countries. Ethnic diversity in the newly
independent ASEAN countries has produced crucial problems for their national
integration and security. Multiethnicity in ASEAN countries has also caused domestic
and diplomatic conflicts. In Chapter II this study will introduce the political culture and
history of complex issues of nationalism, ethnicity, and ethnic nationalism in each
ASEAN country.
Changing Geopolitics and Regional Organizations
The focus of Chapter III will be on changing geopolitical perspectives and
regional security issues through regional organizations in Southeast Asia. These
regional organizations have managed internal and external regional issues. ASEAN is
an important nonstate actor in this region. It was established in 1967 to encourage
cooperation among the member countries in economic, social, and cultural issues.
However, the organization has unofficially promoted political cooperation (Antolik,
1990, Broinowski, 1982, & Yamakage, 1991).

How did ASEAN produce

opportunities to negotiate regional security issues among the member countries? What
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is the basis of the cooperation of the ASEAN countries? Because these questions relate
significantly to current regional and national security problems, Chapter III will
examine the establishment, evolution, and roles of the regional organizations.
Arms Building and Economic Growth
Finally, in Chapters IV and V this study will evaluate military postures and
defense expenditures among the ASEAN countries. Most of the ASEAN countries
recorded significant economic growth after the end of the 1980s and maintained their
arms build up. Their armed forces shifted from counterinsurgency to conventional
forces. How did the end of the Cold War and the economy of the ASEAN countries
influence the expansion of their defense expenditures? Does the regional arms race
threaten some economically frustrated countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam?

CHAPTER II
NATIONALISM, ETHNICITY, AND EfHNIC NATIONALISM
IN AND AMONG THE ASEAN STATES
The ASEAN Countries as New Nation-States
Plural society in the ASEAN countries greatly affects security issues in
Southeast Asia. J. S. Fumivall (1956) contributed studies of colonialism in Southeast
Asia. He examined structures of Southeast Asian colonial society during the 1930s and
named its complex formation "plural society." Furnivall defines "plural society as
different sections of the community living side by side but separately, within the same
political unit" (p. 304). Even after the colonies became independent, plural society
prevented stability within the ASEAN countries and the region.
The ASEAN countries have short histories as nation-states. Nation-state is a
new idea to the citizens of ASEAN, and is not well accepted among these citizens as
compared with the Europeans' ideas of their states. The people of Southeast Asia
belonged to individual groups and communities associated with either chief-based tribal
orders or more complex monarchial arrangements. Some citizens of ASEAN countries
today still do not subscribe to national identities; they associate more with their limited
ethnic groups and communities rather than with their countries.
Nationalism emerged as "ethnic nationalism" or "elite nationalism" in the
ASEAN countries. Each individual group and community, in an ASEAN country, has
its own language, religion, historic experience, ancestors, and culture, and produces a
distinct ethnic identity and nationalism. Strong ethnic identity and ethnic nationalism
maintained each ethnic group isolate from others and prevented unifying the ethnic
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groups for building a nation-state. Ethnic nationalism evolved from the complex plural
society in ASEAN countries but national identities of these countries did not. The
heads of these countries diluted or repressed ethnic minority nationalism, to sustain
their countries. Moreover, national elites often established their national identities to
unify ethnic groups in their countries. The governments educated and spread their
national identities among citizens and tried to bond the different ethnic groups. This
elite nationalism and strong government leadership are common aspects among the
ASEAN countries, and are used to maintain the countries as independent nation-states.
Negara Brunei Darussalm
Negara Brunei Darussalm is the second newest member state of ASEAN.
When Brunei became independent from Britain in 1984, it joined ASEAN as the sixth
member country. Brunei is a small country of approximately 369,000 citizens in
Northeastern Borneo. The dominant populations consist of Malays (65%) and non
indigenous Chinese (20%) (Famighetti, 1993). The Brunei government treats Malays
more warmly than the other ethnic groups. The Chinese are coolly treated by the
government, and noncitizens in Brunei are mainly Chinese (Shimomoto, 1988). Most
of the Malays are Muslims and Islam is the official religion of Brunei. The political
system of Brunei is a constitutional monarchy; however, Brunei is substantially a
monarchy. The monarch of Brunei, called the Sultan, rules the country. The Sultan
has determined that the Malay culture and the Islamic religion should form the national
core.
The democratization movement against the monarchy has been a serious issue in
Brunei. The Sultan and his families have historically dominated Brunei. Sultan
Muhamed established Brunei in the early fifteenth century (Brunei State of Security,
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1976). However, Britain colonized the Sultanate of Brunei in the nineteenth century.
Britain allowed the Sultan of Brunei to establish a self-government in 1959. The Party
Rakyat Brunei (PRB), a nationalistic left wing party, was established by A. M. Azahari
in 1956 (Chandler, 1987). Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman introduced a
plan to establish the Federation of Malaysia, including Brunei, in 1961. When
inhabitants of British Brunei opposed the plan, political movements arose in 1962; PRB
was the center of the movements. PRB opposed not only the federation plan but also
demanded democratization of Brunei. The Sultan of Brunei ignored the demands of
PRB. Azahari visited Manila in October 1962 and announced that if Britain would
enforce the plan of the Federation of Malaysia, people in Brunei would fight against the
Brunei government. Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara (TNKU), PRB's guerrilla
forces trained in Indonesia, rose on December 8, 1962. Azahari declared the
establishment of Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara (NKKU) in Manila and announced
that he was the Prime Minister of NKKU. However, British troops repressed that
revolt within a week. Although Azahari failed to establish his state, democratization is
still a political issue in Brunei today.
The Republic of Indonesia
The Republic of Indonesia is a major power in Southeast Asia and an important
member of ASEAN. Indonesia is the biggest country in this region, and diverse ethnic
groups form the country. The population of Indonesia is approximately 195 million
and shares more than 40% of the total population of Southeast Asia (Famighetti, 1993).
The dominant population (60.72%) is concentrated in Java Island, which is only 6.89%
of the total Indonesian land (Tsuchiya, 1988). The population density in Java is 1,950
people/square mile compared to 17 people/square mile in West Irian. Indonesia
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consists of 13,576 islands. Indonesian citizens live on approximately 992 islands.
More than 300 ethnic groups exist in Indonesia (Sakiyama, 1995). These diverse
ethnic groups have maintained their own cultures. Their identities align with their
tribes, and the ideas of "Indonesia" and being Indonesian citizens are new to the
traditional ethnic groups.
Diverse ethnicity and strong Indonesian nationalism are exclusive characteristics
of the country and have influenced Indonesian political culture (Crouch, 1988). The
Indonesian government is very stable and President Suharto, along with the governing
party, Golkar, has ruled the country more than 30 years (Fujiwara, 1994). Golkar
functional groups center on the military forces. The Indonesian national forces were
one of a few nationwide political groups to connect Indonesian fragmentary society.
The Indonesian military force is a nationalist group and an important political actor in
this country (Crouch, 1988). When Suharto, a major general, took power in 1965, the
national forces became the backbone of Indonesian politics and have integrated the
Indonesian islands as a nation-state. Before 1965 the military forces were only one of
three major powers in Indonesia: religion (Islam), communism, and nationalism (the
national forces) (Murashima, 1993).
Religion strongly contributes to Indonesian politics. Although the Indonesian
constitution does not name a specific national religion, religion is basic in the five
principles of the state called Pancasila (Seekins, 1983). Islam is the most popular
religion in Indonesia, and 88% of Indonesians are Muslims (Famighetti, 1993).
Muslims wanting to establish an Islamic nation have often revolted and opposed the
central government since the Dutch colonial era (Shuto, 1993). Although Muslims
contributed to the independence of Indonesia, they could not maintain their power. The
Indonesian Muslims may be found in different areas and social classes
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(Adiwoso-Suprapto, 1983).

These Muslim groups have never succeeded m

establishing unified power.
Dutch socialists introduced communism during the colonial era and it spread
among workers in the cities. Starvation in rural areas promoted communism outside
the cities. Communists based in Java increased to 35,000 by 1924 (Shuto, 1993).
They revolted to defeat Dutch colonialism in Java and Sumatra in 1926 and 1927 but
were wiped out by the Dutch forces.
Imperial Japanese forces invaded and occupied Dutch Indonesia in March 1942.
The Japanese government promised Sukarno, leader of the Indonesia National Party,
the independence of Indonesia and required him to support Japanese policies. The
Japanese forces trained Indonesians and created the Defenders of the Fatherland (Peta)
in 1943 to assist the Japanese. By the end of World War II, it had some 37,000 armed
men on Java and 20,000 in Sumatra (Seekins, 1983). Its officers formed an important
element of the leadership of the postwar armed forces of independent Indonesia.
When imperial Japan collapsed in August 1945, Sukarno declared the
independence of Indonesia. Then the British and Dutch coalition troops landed on
Indonesian soil to recolonize Indonesia and the war for independence broke out.
Britain approved Sulawesi and Sumatra as territories of Indonesia in 1946 and
withdrew its troops. The Dutch colonial government arrested the dominant Indonesian
political leaders including Sukarno. However, the Indonesian military leaders
continued to command troops and fought the Dutch forces.
Finally, the Netherlands approved the sovereignty of Indonesia in December
1949, and the war for independence ended. Wartime military leadership motivated
Indonesian military forces to become political. The four-year war of independence
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against Britain and the Netherlands formed the basis of Indonesian nationalism and
military leadership (Tas, 1974).
When Indonesia opposed Dutch colonialism, its Muslims, nationalists, and
communists insisted also on anticapitalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-fascism (Shuto,
1993). Although significant ideological differences did not exist among the three
political groups, Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), an Indonesian communist party,
began to conflict with Muslims and the national forces after Indonesia became
independent.
National integration was one of the important political issues after Indonesia
became sovereign. Ethnic groups revolted in Java, Sulawesi, and Sumatra, and the
government was concerned that external powers might intervene in Indonesia during
the rebellions (Morrison, 1981). As a result, they produced Indonesian domestic and
diplomatic policies to integrate the nation and to strengthen the central government's
power. They emphasized original Indonesian diplomacy to promote Indonesian
nationalism (Morrison, 1981).
The Indonesian government used religion to integrate Indonesian plural society
and to maintain Indonesia as a nation-state. President Sukarno declared religion as one
of his three political principles--nationalism, religion, and communism--for national
unity during the end of the 1950s (Grant, 1964, & Seekins, 1983).
He also insisted on a nonalignment policy in relation to the Cold War. Sukarno
held the Asian-African conference in Bandung, Java in 1955, and 29 nonaligned
countries participated in the conference (Okakura, 1992). Indonesia became a leader of
the nonaligned countries. The success of the conference satisfied nationalism among
the Indonesian citizens. Indonesia was determined to be the leader of Southeast Asia.
Indonesia opposed imperialism and tried to crush Malaysia because it saw the
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establishment of Malaysia as the formation of a new British colony (Leifer, 1983).
Malay nationalists in Indonesia supported Sukarno's confrontation policy against
Malaysia. Sukarno's anti-imperialist policy promoted expansion of PKI (Shuto,
1993). Sukarno rapidly connected with communist countries and established the
Jakarta-Hanoi-Peking axis.
On the other hand, national forces and Muslims opposed the communists, and
conflict escalated. The national forces established three political organizations-
Kosgoro, Mkgr and Soksi--between 1957 and 1963 (Shuto, 1993). A meeting of
Soksi leaders decided to establish Sekretariat Bersama Organisasi-orga-nisasi
Golonngan Karya (Sekber-Golkar) to oppose PKI, and 61 political organizations
participated in Sekber-Golkar.
Leftwing military personnel, commanded by a lieutenant colonel of the
presidential bodyguard, killed six anticommunist army leaders and occupied the central
TV station in Jakarta in September 30, 1965 (Tas, 1974). An army general, Suharto,
suppressed the military rebellion. He insisted that PKI had led the rebellion and began
to wipe out communists. The national forces killed from 160,000 to 500,000 people
who appeared to be communists or their sympathizers (Seekins, 1983). After the
incident occurred, Suharto took power, and Sekber-Golkar supported the new
government.
Islamic parties were also anticommunist political powers and Suharto used the
conflict between Muslims and communists. The national army cooperated with the
Muslims and destroyed the PKI. However, Suharto was concerned that Muslims
possessed too much political power (Kimura, 1989). He considered that Islamic
parties would cause political instability and therefore repressed them (Nakamura, 1994,
& Shuto, 1993).
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Suharto's government decided to stand with Sekber-Golkar, and candidates of
Sekber-Golkar participated in the national election as the governing party in 1971.
Sekber-Golkar won the election and renamed itself Golkar.
Since then President Suharto and Golkar have ruled Indonesia. The core of
Golkar is the national forces, and the national forces have a strong presence in
Indonesian politics (Fujiwara, 1994, & Shinn, 1983). By force the Indonesian military
government has unified the diverse Indonesian society and has maintained a veneer of
Indonesian nationalism.
Malaysia
Because Malaysia peacefully gained independence from Britain, it does not have
the strong responses against colonial powers that Indonesia has. The Federation of
Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak united and formed Malaysia in 1963.
Malaysia adopted federalism. It consisted of 13 states governed by Sultans, chiefs of
Islamic tribes (Gullick, 1981). The sovereign of Malaysia was elected among nine
Sultans in a five-year period. Most of the actual power belongs to the federal
government which ensures its governing power.
Malaysia is a multiethnic nation. The population of Malaysia was 18.4 million
in 1992 and lived in two separated territories, Western Malaysia (Malay Peninsula) and
Eastern Malaysia (Western Borneo) (Famighetti, 1993). The Malaysians consist of
three ethnic groups: Malays (59%), Chinese (32%), and Indians (9%). Malays form
the dominant ethnic group in Malaysia but not in Eastern Malaysia. Malays share
19.7% and 2.8% of the total populations of Sarawak and Sabah (Kato, 1994). Most of
the Malays are Muslims, and Islam is the national religion (Kuchiba, 1994). However,
the natives in Eastern Malaysia, called Bumiputra, are mostly Christians. This ethnic
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complexity has caused instability in Malaysia. Conflicts between ethnic Chinese and
ethnic Malay especially were internal threats (Gullick, 1981). These ethnic conflicts
have influenced the sovereignty and nationalism of Malaysia.
The colonial policy of Britain is the root of Malaysian plural society (Andaya,
1982, & Kato, 1994). Britain and the Netherlands concluded a treaty and decided their
territories in Southeast Asia in 1824. As a result, Malaya, Singapore, and Western
Borneo became British colonies. Tin and rubber were the main industries of British
Malaya including Singapore. Chinese immigrated to Malaya to develop tin mines. The
development of rubber plantations depended on Indian immigration. The ratio of
Malays, Chinese, and Indians was 88%, 8%, and 4% between 1835 and 1840, but the
ratio of the three ethnic groups became 45%, 40%, and 15% by 1931 (Kato, 1994).
The current Malaysian plural society was formed during the end of the nineteenth
century. Foreign Chinese dominated economic activities in the Malayan cities. For
example, Kuala Lumpur, developed by the tin industry, was dominated by the Chinese
(79% in 1891) (Nakahara, 1994). Chinese shared 74% of the total population of
Singapore that year. Indians mainly joined the rubber industry, and most of the Malays
were farmers. British colonial policy divided and isolated these ethnic groups, and they
did not mix much with each other (Andaya, 1982, Hagiwara, 1988, & Kaneko, 1994).
Independence movements arose in each ethnic; group during the early twentieth
century, but they did not unite (Brown, 1994, Lee, 1981, & Hagiwara, 1988).
Malayan Malays, whom Sukarno influenced, established Kesatuan Melayu Muda
(KMM) to become independent. Ethnic Chinese also established the Malayan
Communist Party (MCP) in 1930 and opposed British colonialism. The British
colonial government repressed the KMM and MCP and arrested leaders of the political
parties.
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Imperial Japan invaded and occupied British Malaya in 1941. The Japanese
troops established military rule. The Japanese colonial government released the leaders
of the KMM, whom the British had arrested, and made them cooperate with the
Japanese colonial government. In contrast, the imperial forces repressed the Chinese.
The MCP formed guerrilla forces and fought against the Japanese troops. Then
conflicts between Malays and Chinese began.
After allied forces defeated imperial Japan, Britain prepared its colonies in
Southeast Asia for independence. The first step to independence was the autonomy of
Malaya. The British submitted the plan of the Republic of Malaya in which each ethnic
group would have equal rights in the British Parliament. The nine Sultans in Malaya
agreed to the plan. However, Malay citizens opposed the plan because if the Chinese
population increased more than the Malays, then Malaya would no longer be ruled by
the Malays (Nakahara, 1994). The opposition politicized the Malays and they
established the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in 1946. On the other
hand, the MCP escalated their guerrilla activities. The British government was
concerned about increasing MCP guerrilla forces, and so it gave Malays privilege,
forming the Federation of Malaya as a British autonomous state in 1948 (Hagiwara,
1988, & Lee, 1981).
The MCP, formed by immigrant Chinese, insisted on supplanting British
imperialism and on the independence of Malaya (Andaya, 1982, & Gullick, 1981).
The British colonial government declared an emergency in 1948. Chinese citizens were
forced to move to isolated "new villages" (Andaya, 1982, p. 260).

Malays joined

special police and militia to destroy the MCP, and ethnic conflict escalated.
Singapore, where Chinese citizens dominated, established its autonomy in
1959. The Singapore government produced an ethnic policy in which each ethnic

21
group had equal rights. The Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah
united, and Malaysia was established in 1963. However, the ethnic policy of Malaysia,
in which Malays had privileges, caused serious conflicts between the Malaysian federal
government and the State of Singapore (Kaneko, 1994, & Ryan, 1976). Singapore
separated from Malaysia and became independent in 1965.
Although Singapore became independent, conflicts between Malay and Chinese
Malaysians increased. Finally, the two ethnic groups clashed in May 13, 1969
(Andaya, 1982, & Brown, 1994). Politically suppressed Chinese citizens, who
dominated economic activities in Malaysia, increased their complaints. The Democratic
Action Party (DAP) opposed the Malays' political predominance and insisted on the end
of the Malays' special privileges. DAP increased its parliament seats at the national
election in May 10, 1969. Then Chinese Malaysians supporting the DAP clashed with
Malay Malaysians who supported the ruling party. Military forces and police
consisting mainly of Malays repressed the ethnic riots. The government announced
that 196 citizens had been killed and 9,143 arrested. Most of them were Chinese
(Brown, 1994). After the ethnic riots, the government enforced the Bumiputra policy
that strengthened Malay privileges and promoted Malay participation in economic
activities.
The Republic of the Philippines
The Sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines was vulnerable, and the
destiny of the Philippines was decided by the bargaining and struggles of great powers
(Morrison, 1981). Imperial powers--Spain, Britain, the United States, and Japan--had
colonized the Philippines since the sixteenth century. Opposition to imperial powers
united the Filipinos (McCoy, 1981). The Philippine resistance to colonial powers has a
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long history. Nationalists of the Philippines are categorized in three groups: (1) elite
nationalists who had related to the colonial governments, (2) laborers and peasants in
the lower classes, and (3) Muslims from the Southern Philippines. Elite nationalists are
the Filipinos who benefitted from the colonial powers. They still have ties with the
United States, a former suzerain State, and continue to have power even after
independence. On the other hand, nationalism of the laborers and peasants has existed
since the nineteenth century. Nationalism among poor Filipinos was connected with
communism and they participated with communist guerrilla forces fighting against the
colonial governments.
The Philippines adopted the American type of legislature system; however, a
few elite family members, rich landlords and company presidents, have influential
political power in the Philippines (Steinberg, 1994). Political corruption and the class
society make the Philippines unstable, and its economic growth is the worst among the
ASEAN countries (Nakanishi, 1994). Undemocratic social systems that go back to the
colonial era have caused social instability, shaking the sovereignty of the Philippines.
Nationalism in the Philippines is related to these class struggles--a remnant of the
colonial systems.
The Philippines had been under Spanish rule since 1565. The colonial policy of
Spain formed a class system in the Philippines, and the citizens were divided between
landlords and tenant farmers (McCoy, 1981, & Steinberg, 1994). Landlords were
mainly Mestizos. They managed large plantations where many tenant farmers worked.
When wealthy educated landlords began to recognize themselves as Filipinos, they
opposed the discrimination and colonial policies of the Spanish rulers.
The colonial government repressed the nationalist movements. The elite
Filipinos criticized suppression by the Spanish rulers. Their activities were called
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Propaganda movements (McCoy, 1981, & Seekins, 1984). Jose Rizal, who was the
leader of the movements, established La Liga Filipina to promote peaceful colonial
reformation. However, he was arrested and was executed in 1896.
Although the Propaganda movements failed, they did encourage intellectuals in
the lower class and laborers. Andores Bonifacio and Emilio Aguinaldo were two who
established Katipunan, an underground political organization, in Manila in 1892 and
extended its support (McCoy, 1981, & Seekins, 1984). When the colonial government
detected Katipunan in 1896, Katipunan revolted against the Spanish rulers. The
revolutionary forces led the rebellion until 30,000 Spanish solders arrived in the
Philippines. Then Bonifacio and Aguinaldo struggled with each other and Bonifacio
was executed by Aguinaldo in 1897. Aguinaldo fled to Hong Kong.
The end of the Spanish-American War in 1898 ended Spanish rule in the
Philippines (McCoy, 1981, Seekins, 1984, & Steinberg, 1994). Aguinaldo returned.
He declared the independence of the Philippines in June 1898 and established the
revolutionary government. However, the United States concluded a peace treaty with
Spain. As a result, the Philippines became an American territory and the American
government sent troops to the Philippines. Aguinaldo enacted the Malolos constitution
and established the Republic of the Philippines in 1899. However, American troops
defeated the revolutionary forces, and the Philippines became an American colony.
For stability the United States encouraged Filipinos to participate in the colonial
government. The elite Filipinos connected with the American rulers and kept their
status as rich landlords (Seekins, 1984). They americanized, and they began to lead the
Philippines. The governing class Filipinos possessed great power and led wealthy
lives; in contrast, the predominant citizens were poor tenant farmers and laborers.
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The strong class system created an attitude of discontent among the lower class
that caused labor movements and riots. The Sakdal Party, established by Benigno R.
Ramos in 1933, became the center of anti-landlords and anti-U.S. civic movements
(Seekins, 1984). The party demanded complete independence of all the Philippines at
once. Sakdal sent many representatives to the Philippine Parliament in the election in
1934, and extremists of Sakdal revolted to become independent in 1935.
Nevertheless, the rebellion was repressed by the government.
On the other hand, the Socialist Party Philippine and the Communist Party
Philippine unified in 1938 and the Philippine Communist Party (PKP) was formed
(Nagano, 1994, & Seekins, 1984). The communist party headed labor and farmer
movements. Hukbalahap, anti-Japanese guerrilla forces, supported by the PKP, was
established during World War II and opposed the Japanese occupant forces. Many
tenant farmers participated in the guerrilla forces. After the independence of the
Philippines in 1946, with United States troops present, Hukbalahap demanded true
independence and land reform. Although Hukbalahap had fought against imperial
Japan, the government and the U.S. troops repressed Hukbalahap as a communist
organization. The PKP and Hukbalahap were defeated by 1953.
However, escalation of the Vietnam War promoted anti-landlords and anti-U.S.
civic movements again during the 1960s (Nagano, 1994, & Steinberg, 1994). The
PKP was reestablished in 1968 and renamed itself the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP). Hukbalahap became the basis for the New People's Army (NPA),
guerrilla forces of CPP. The Philippine economy, politics, and national forces,
dominated by a few elite Filipinos, grew corrupt, and the NPA extended its influence.
Conflict between Christians and Muslims is another problem for national
integration of the Philippines (Gouda, 1994, Seekins, 1984, & Steinberg, 1994).

25
Muslims in the Philippines are a minority and comprise 5% of the total population
(Famighetti, 1993).

They live in the Southern Philippines and assert their

independence. Muslim Filipinos, called Moro, established the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF) to fight with the central government and with national forces
(Steinberg, 1994). Independence movements by Muslims arose in Mindanao Island in
1968 (Seekins, 1984, & Steinberg, 1994). President Ferdinand E. Marcos declared an
emergency and the national forces confronted the MNLF.
The Republic of Singapore
The Republic of Singapore is sometimes called a small Chinese island in the sea
of Malays (Tanaka, 1988). Singapore is a country of immigrants. Most of the
Singaporeans are immigrants and their descendents. Singapore originated as a small
fishing village (Kani, 1994, & Nakahara, 1993). Then immigrants formed Singapore
and it became a British colony. The dominant immigrants were Chinese, sharing 77%
of the total population of Singapore (Famighetti, 1993). Indonesia and Malaysia,
Malay countries, were concerned that Singapore could be a foothold for communist
China in Southeast Asia and called Singapore a "third China" (Brown, 1994, p. 78).
The Singaporean government was worried about its image.

The government

emphasized that the citizens of Singapore are Singaporeans and not foreign Chinese,
Indians, or Malays.
Singapore had been headed by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and the People's
Action Party (PAP) (Brown, 1994, Iwasaki, 1993, & Tanizawa, 1981). PAP has
dominated the parliament since 1959. Weak opposition parties and special interest
groups are the political culture of Singapore (Iwasaki, 1993). Although Lee was an
ethnic Chinese, he worried about rising Chinese nationalism in Singapore (Brown,

26
1994, & Morrison, 1981). He was concerned that escalating Chinese nationalism
would dissolve Singapore. Singapore had been formed with a balance among Chinese,
Indian, and Malays and opposed interventions by neighboring countries.
In 1819, Singapore was just an island at the end of the Malay Peninsula where
120 Malay fishers and 30 Chinese farmers lived (Kani, 1994, & Nakahara, 1993).
Stanford Raffles, a British executive of the East India Company, bargained with the
Sultan of Jhohore, the Southern part of Malay Peninsula, to put the small island under
British rule. After Singapore became a British colony, he developed the island as a free
port.. The development required laborers. Chinese, Indian, and Malay laborers
immigrated to Singapore to earn money and formed isolated ethnic groups. The
population of Singapore quickly expanded, and by 1860 80,792 people were living
there (Ryan, 1976). The dominant immigrants (50,000) were Chinese. They were
overseas laborers who did not identify as Singaporeans.
The imperial Japanese troops invaded and occupied British Singapore in 1942.
The Japanese occupant government cruelly ruled overseas Chinese in Singapore. The
Japanese forces killed from 5,000 to 50,000 Chinese who were viewed as supporters
of mainland China or resisting the Japanese troops (Nakahara, 1993). On the other
hand, anti-British nationalism among Indians and Malays was encouraged by the
occupant government, and they were required to support the Japanese troops. The
Chinese in Singapore formed communist guerrilla forces based on the Malayan
Communist Party, and fought with the Japanese troops.
After the war ended, Britain recolonized Singapore; however, the inhabitants of
Singapore gave rise to nationalism and demanded independence. The communist
guerrilla forces in British Malaya, including Singapore, fought to become independent.
The Federation of Malaya established autonomy in 1948, but Singapore was
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continuously ruled by Britain for two main reasons: (1) Singapore was strategically
important for the British forces, and (2) if the Federation of Malaya included
Singapore, Chinese would dominate the populations of the federation (Tanaka, 1994).
Chinese had influential economic power in Malaya and the Malayans were concerned
that the Chinese would also dominate the politics of Malaya.
Singapore established autonomy in 1959 as a British commonwealth. The
People's Action Party won the national election that year and Lee Kuan Yew became
the Prime Minister. The independence of Singapore was the most important political
issue for him (Ryan, 1976, & Tanaka, 1988).

Ethnic disintegration obstructed

Singapore's attempt to become independent. Prime Minister Lee insisted on the
unification of Singapore with Malaya to become independent from Britain. He declared .
English as the public language and Malay as a national language. Lee kept equal rights
among ethnic groups (Brown, 1994, & Tanaka, 1988). Although the dominant
Chinese opposed learning English, Lee promoted English education to integrate ethnic
groups and to bring Singaporeans together.
Malaysia formed with Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore to become
independent in 1963. If Malaya and Singapore alone had formed Malaysia, then
Chinese citizens would become the biggest ethnic group (Tanaka, 1994). Sabah and
Sarawak were needed to establish a "Malay Malaysia." Malaya and Singapore each had
formed different ethnic policies since Malaya established its autonomy in 1948.
Malaysia's ethnic policy gave Malays special privileges among the ethnic groups. Lee
insisted on ethnic equality and a "Malaysian Malaysia" but not a Malay Malaysia (Ryan,
1976, p. 301). His assertion conflicted with the ethnic policy in Malaysia. Malays
were worried that Malaysia would be economically and politically dominated by the
Chinese (Brown, 1994). Ethnic conflicts between Chinese and Malays escalated,
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causing riots in Singapore in 1964. Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia
had to decide either to arrest Lee or separate Singapore from Malaysia. Singapore
separated from Malaysia and became independent in 1965. Ethnic problems are still
sensitive issues in Singapore and have caused conflicts with Indonesia and Malaysia,
where Malays have privileges.
The Kingdom of Thailand
The sovereign leader of Thailand is Bhumibol Adulyadej, Rama IX, and the
Royal families have kept their political influence in the Thai constitutional monarchy
(Famighetti, 1993). External threats have caused the national forces to increase in
political power. During the last 20 years military forces have often intervened in Thai
politics (Matsuou, 1988, & Murashima, 1992). Although military interventions
influenced Thai politics, the government needed Royal family support for their
legitimacy in order to manage Thailand. The Royal family still forms the Thai national
identity and integrates the country.
The Kingdom of Thailand is the only country that has continuously maintained
its sovereignty among the ASEAN countries. However, external powers and internal
ethnic conflicts threatened the sovereignty of Thailand. France and Britain continued to
colonize the Indochina Peninsula during the early nineteenth century. Although Burma,
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam became colonies of the Western imperial powers,
Thailand avoided colonization. Other countries threatened Thailand, but the threat
promoted its national integration.
The nationalism of Chinese and Malays caused ethnic conflicts and internally
threatened the sovereignty of Thailand. Approximately 75% of the population of
Thailand is Thais, while 14% are Chinese (Famighetti, 1993). The government
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proposed an assimilation policy to Chinese in Thailand during the 1930s and 1940s
(Matsuou, 1988, & Wyatt, 1984). The policy succeeded, and Thailand kept uniformity
compared with the other ASEAN countries. Anti-Chinese policies adopted in Indonesia
and Malaysia do not exist in Thailand now. On the other hand, Malays in Southern
Thailand created other problems for national integration (Ayabe, 1994). They live near
the boundary between Malaysia and Thailand and insist on separation from Thailand.
Imperial powers threatened Thailand during the modern era. Britain and France
colonized Indochina Peninsula in the nineteenth century. Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam were colonized by France. Burma and Malaya were colonized by Britain.
Thailand, surrounded by the Western colonial powers, strengthened centralism of the
monarchy. Rama V, Chulalongkon, reformed the social, political and economic
systems of Thailand to avoid colonization (Terwiel, 1983, & Wyatt, 1984). He denied
the autonomy of regional Thailand and concentrated the governing power. The
monarch established a modern bureaucracy and military forces made up of people who
were educated in European countries. Rama V also emphasized loyalty to the Thai
nation, Buddhism, and the king.

Although the monarch introduced Western

bureaucracy and military systems, he criticized Western culture and protected the Thai
culture. Thailand ceded Eastern Cambodia to France and the adjacent four states with
Malaya to Britain. However, Thailand succeeded in maintaining its sovereignty.
The monarch worried about not only external threats but also internal threats of
Chinese nationalism (Okabe, 1989, & Wyatt, 1984). Chinese immigrated to Thailand
until the mid-twentieth century. They continued to hold allegiance for China. The
Chinese had established their own schools and published Chinese newspapers to keep
the Chinese culture in Thailand. The number of children studying in Chinese schools
increased until 1938. Chinese teachers came from China to teach at the schools, and

30

the textbooks and courses used in the schools were the same as those used in China.
Thai was taught only a little at the schools.
Rama VI, Vajiravudh, criticized the Chinese behavior in the newspaper, Sham
Observer, in 1914 to 1915. In an article, titled "The Jews of the East," he compared
the Chinese with the Jews (Wyatt, 1984, p. 229). He insisted the dangers of the
Chinese are (a) foreign Chinese do not want to be true Thai citizens, choosing to keep
their identity as foreigners and taking their profits earned in Thailand back to China; (b)
they do not have loyalty to Thailand and neglect their duty; (c) Chinese look down on
the Thais; and (d) earning money is the purpose of their lives. Because they would
work for the lowest wages, they deprived other races of work opportunities (Okabe,
1989). This article caused controversy over ethnic Chinese in Thailand. Vajiravudh
and his supporters criticized the Chinese because they were not true Thais who used the
Thai language, had loyalty to Thailand, and economically contributed to Thailand.
Bureaucrats, who were educated in Europe, connected with the national forces
and defeated the monarchy of Thailand in 1932. Then the Thai governing systems
shifted from a monarchy to a constitutional monarchy system. The new government
insisted on democracy and nationalism, thus promoting national integration.
Educational reform was an important platform of the governing party (Okabe, 1989, &
Wyatt, 1984). The government ordered the Chinese schools to teach more Thai than
Chinese. However, the Chinese opposed the policy and did not obey it. Finally, the
government closed the all Chinese schools and prohibited publication of Chinese
newspapers in 1939. The Chinese were purged from 27 kinds of occupations in 1942.
After the end of World War II in 1945, the Chinese schools were reestablished.
Thailand had formed an alliance with imperial Japan during the war. The allied
powers, including China, defeated Japan. As a result, the Chinese in Thailand ignored
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the Thai laws and reopened Chinese schools (Okabe, 1989). Ethnic conflicts increased
and riots occurred.

Communist China was established in 1945 and the Thai

government was concerned with its Chinese "as a possible fifth column of subversion
on behalf of a communist China" (Wyatt, 1984, p. 267). The government limited
Chinese immigration and sent Thai principals to the Chinese schools to manage the
schools (Girling, 1981). Chinese education disintegrated. Conflicts between Thais
and Chinese have diminished since the 1970s.
Malay Muslims, living near the boundary between Malaysia and Thailand, have
presented other problems for national integration. They mainly live in five border states
and dominate in four of those states (Ayabe, 1994, & Girling, 1981). They insist on
separation from Thailand and their independence. The Thai government repressed their
rebellions and abolished the Islamic Sultan systems; however, the government could
not abolish Islamic education. Muslims continued their Islamic education even after the
constitutional revolution in 1932.
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam
The Vietnamese have a long history of national integration among the ASEAN
countries. External threats have influenced the formation of national identity in
Vietnam. Vietnam had been under Chinese rule more than one thousand years before it
became an independent country in 968 A.O. (Buttinger, 1968). Vietnam was colonized
by France during the end of the nineteenth century. Vietnamese fought with France and
the United States to become independent for 30 years after World War II. Right after
the Vietnam War ended, border disputes between Cambodia and Vietnam caused
Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. China announced a need to punish Vietnam, and
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Chinese troops invaded Vietnam in 1979. The Vietnamese have continuously fought
with external powers. Vietnamese nationalism was cultivated due to external threats.
Vietnamese nationalism is an ideological basis of the Vietnam Communist Party
(Furuta, 1994). The communist party was established by Nguyen Ai Quoc in 1930,
and he led the movement for the independence of Vietnam (SarDesai, 1992). He was
later called Ho Chi Minh. After the unification of Vietnam in 1975, the communist
party governed Vietnam as the single dominant party. The doctrine of Marx and Lenin
is the ideological basis of the communist party and nation-building. In addition, the
communist party adopted Ho Chi Minh's ideals in 1991 (Furuta, 1994). He
emphasized Vietnamese nationalism and culture. The identity of the party is gradually
changing from communism to nationalism after the Cold War.
Although Vietnam has conflicted with China, the Vietnamese culture has been
influenced by China (Buttinger, 1958, & SarDesai, 1992). The Chinese identity spread
into Vietnamese and integrated Vietnam. Vietnam was formed with more than 60 ethnic
groups. Viets form the core ethnic group in Vietnam and make up 84% of the total
population (Famighetti, 1993). Because of the external threats, the state of Vietnam
integrated a at very early age. Vietnam had been an independent country since the tenth
century.
The origin of Vietnam goes back to Van Lang, the first Viet monarchy,
governed by An Lac in the third century B.C. (Buttinger, 1958). China conquered the
monarchy in the end of the second century B.C. and ruled the Viets for more than
1,000 years. The dominance of China weakened in the tenth century. When Dinh Bo
Linh, a powerful Viet clan leader, established a monarchy in 968, Viets were released
from Chinese rule. Ly Hoan took power in 1010 and developed the capital in Hanoi.
The emperor Ly named the kingdom Dai Viet (SarDesai, 1992). Mongols invaded Dai
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Viet in 1257, 1284, and 1287, but Viets defeated the Mongolian troops (Buttinger,
1958). However, China invaded Dai Viet again in 1406 and occupied it by 1418.
Monarchs of Dai Viet acted humble to China to avoid invasion but behaved as emperors
to the Southeast Asian countries (SarDesai, 1992). Dai Viet behaved as a small
Chinese empire. Dai Viet invaded neighboring countries and expanded its territory.
Nguyen Phuc Anh formed today's territory in 1802 and became the emperor. He
renamed Dai Viet as Vietnam.
France sent its troops to Vietnam in 1858 and occupied the three southern states
in 1867 (Buttinger, 1958). The states were named Cochinchina and were directly ruled
by France. France established the Federation of Indochina, consisting of Cambodia,
Laos, and Vietnam, in the early twentieth century. However, Vietnamese resistance
continuously distressed the French rulers, and the colonial government repressed the
nationalist movements (McAlister, 1969). Revolutionary nationalists participated in
terrorist activities and laborers and farmers went on strike. Ho Chi Minh, who was
educated as a communist in Moscow, united the communist movements and established
the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930.
Vietnam was under the rule of France and Japan during World War II. The
imperial Japanese troops entered Vietnam from the Chinese boundary in 1940. A
branch of the communist party in Northern Vietnam rose to release some states from
Japanese rule. That rebellion was repressed soon, but the rebellion led the founding of
the Vietnam Independence League, known as the Viet Minh (McAlister, 1969). Ho Chi
Minh wanted the release and independence of Vietnam. He established the Viet Minh to
oppose French and Japanese imperialism in 1941. When the Soviet troops invaded
Japanese territory in China in 1945, the Vietnamese rose up in Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh
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declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi on
September 2, 1945.
French forces reestablished rule in Saigon in September 22, 1945. France
wanted to keep Southern Vietnam under French rule (Buttinger, 1968, & McAlister,
1969). Ho Chi Minh and the French rulers began neg_otiating for the independence of
Vietnam. However, negotiations were broken off, and the Indochina War between Viet
Minh and France began in 1946. French troops overwhelmed the Viet Minh troops
initially. Communist China, independent in 1949, supported Vietnam and by 1954 the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam expanded its territory by approximately 80% (Takada,
1994). On the other side, France supported the Emperor Bao Dai and established Bao
Dai Vietnam against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Then the war for
independence became a war between communist Vietnam and capitalist Vietnam
(Buttinger, 1968, & SarDesai, 1992). The United States gave financial and military aid
to France. Viet Minh defeated the French troops at Dien Bien Phu in 1953, ending the
Indochina War. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and France negotiated with the
United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China over the independence of Vietnam
in Geneva. Although the Viet Minh defeated France, Vietnam was divided into the
North and South. That meeting decided that the unification of Vietnam would be
determined by the national election in 1957.
Ngo Dinh Diem took power instead of Bao Dai in South Vietnam in 1955. He
ignored the election for unification. The United States supported the Diem government
because it produced strong anticommunist policies. The Vietnam Labor Party, the
communist party in North Vietnam, felt that peaceful unification with Diem's South
Vietnam was impossible. The communist party decided to establish the South Vietnam
National Liberation Front (NLF) in South Vietnam in late 1960 to achieve unification
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by force (SarDesai, 1992). NLF fought with the South Vietnamese troops and defeated
them. The South Vietnamese did not support Ngo Dinh Diem and anti-government
movements rose up. Diem and his family were assassinated during a military rebellion
supported by the United States in 1963 (Buttinger, 1968, & SarDesai, 1992).
The civil war in South Vietnam escalated to a war between North Vietnam and
the United States. President Johnson announced that the North Vietnam Navy had
attacked an American warship in common waters in Tonkin bay in August 1964
(Buttinger, 1968, & SarDesai, 1992). The Tonkin incident caused the United States to
directly intervene in the Vietnam War. The American forces struck North Vietnam and
sent 500,000 military personnel to Vietnam "to fight in an undeclared war" (SarDesai,
1992, p. 84). However, the American forces could not defeat the communist guerrilla
forces. By 1968 international and domestic public opinion turned against the Vietnam
War, while the unexpected number of war dead, and the dollar crisis forced the United
Stated to negotiate in Paris in 1968 with North Vietnam on the withdrawal of the U.S.
troops. The United States began to withdraw its troops from Vietnam in 1969 and
finished the withdrawal in 1973. After the U.S. withdrawal communist forces, in
violation of the Geneva accords, attacked and defeated the South Vietnamese forces in
1975. The Vietnam War ended and North and South Vietnam unified in 1976.
After the United States-China rapprochement in 1972, relations between China
and Vietnam cooled down (Furuta, 1994).

China supported the Cambodian

government led by Pol Pot (SarDesai, 1992). Cambodian troops entered Vietnam and
destroyed villages near the border. The Vietnamese government sent Vietnamese
Chinese, whose loyalty was suspect, to the border and formed a buffer zone.
Cambodia broke diplomatic relations with Vietnam in 1977. Finally, Vietnam
counterattacked Cambodia and brought it under Vietnamese control in December 1978.

36

Right after Vietnam's invasion, China invaded Vietnam, in February 1979, to 'teach a
lesson' to it for its behavior toward Cambodia (SarDesai, 1992, p. 135). The battle
between China and Vietnam continued for a month. Vietnam began to withdraw its
troops from Cambodia by 1989. Vietnam also fought with China over territorial
disputes in Spratly Island, the South China Sea, in 1988.
Conclusion
Western imperial powers have entered Southeast Asia and established colonies
since the sixteenth century. Thailand is the only country that has kept its sovereignty in
this region. The Philippines have a long history as a colony. Spain, Britain, the
United States, and Japan ruled the Philippines. Vietnam was under Chinese rule for
more than 1,000 years. Although Vietnam was released from Chinese rule, France
colonized it in the modem era. Vietnam fought with colonial powers for 30 years for
its sovereignty. Indonesia also experienced a four-year war for independence against
the Netherlands. In contrast, British colonies that later became Brunei, Malaysia, and
Singapore did not experience heavy fighting to become independent, although
independence movements did arise in these colonies.
ASEAN consists of fragmentary ethnic groups divided by political boundaries
during the colonial era. The dominant populations of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
the Philippines are ethnic Malays. Singapore's, Thailand's, and Vietnam's populations
mainly consist of Chinese, Thais, and Viets. Ethnic minority groups present serious
problems for national integration in the ASEAN countries.
Conflict between Chinese and the other ethnic groups is the most common
ethnic problem in this region. Chinese were the core communist guerrilla forces in
Southeast Asia. ASEAN countries, except Vietnam, were concerned that their Chinese
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residents might be communists, especially after communist China was established in
1949. But the Chinese maintained influential economic power and continuously held
allegiance to China. They maintained the Chinese culture in the foreign countries. The
governments worried about rising Chinese nationalism and communism in their
countries and repressed the Chinese people.
Most of the ASEAN countries have centralized governing systems and strong
political leadership to integrate their nations. Top-down and elite nationalism are other
characteristics of the ASEAN countries. The complicated national structures of these
countries caused serious problems for nation-building. Nationalism contributed not
only to national integration but also to dissolving nations in Southeast Asia. Rising
nationalism did not simply mean rising uniform nationalist movements in the ASEAN
countries.

Encouragement of nationalism also stimulated a backlash of ethnic

nationalism. The governments encouraged rising nationalism for national integration
but repressed ethnic nationalism arising from minorities. The sovereignties of the
ASEAN countries were established with a delicate balance of their ethnic groups.

CHAPTER III
CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES AND
SECURITY ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Collective and Individual Responses to Security Issues in Southeast Asia
ASEAN countries, collectively and individually, have responded to security
issues in the changing geopolitical perspectives in Southeast Asia. Some members
were friendly with the former suzerain states. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Singapore had security treaties with the United Kingdom and the United States. Some
of these countries formed Western military alliances in Southeast Asia, the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement
(AMDA).
On the other hand, the Association of Southeast Asia, Maphilindo, and ASEAN
are regional organizations that provided the opportunity for Southeast Asian member
countries to negotiate security issues with each other. ASEAN especially increased its
importance in the changing geopolitical scene after the 1970s. Although Southeast
Asian countries with different security perspectives participated in ASEAN, they
produced coherent security polices through ASEAN as a bloc.
While the ASEAN countries were in the process of nation-building, some
members such as Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam increased their military capabilities
(Ebata, 1994b). These countries were near relatively strong countries. Singapore is a
small island between two potentially antagonistic countries, Indonesia and Malaysia.
Thailand was threatened by Vietnamese forces in Cambodia during the 1980s. Vietnam
shared a boundary with its ancient colonizer China. Although Thailand, Vietnam, and
38
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Singapore possessed the greatest military forces of ASEAN, they were also supported
by external countries. This chapter examines geopolitical changes and challenges of
the ASEAN countries with respect to security issues.
The Collapse of Japanese Rule and End of Colonialism
European Colonies and Japanese Attack
Before Imperial Japan invaded and occupied Southeast Asia, it (except Thailand)
was under the control of the European colonial powers. Imperial powers colonized and
divided Southeast Asia during the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. Colonial forces
suppressed rebellions caused by ethnic groups and nationalist parties. After the
European imperial powers established colonies in Southeast Asia, regional conflict
ceased. Until Imperial Japan invaded their colonies, serious external threats did not
exist in Southeast Asia (Pluvier, 1974).
When the Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on December 7,
1941, World War II broke out in the Asian Pacific region. The Imperial Japanese
forces landed on peninsulas and islands in Southeast Asia. The U.S. and British
troops in the Philippines, Borneo, and Malaya were defeated by Japanese lightning
attacks during the end of 1941. Thailand made an alliance with Japan that year and kept
its sovereignty as a result (Wyatt, 1984). The Japanese forces needed natural resources
in Southeast Asia to sustain the war (Pluvier, 1974). Japanese naval troops put most of
Southeast Asia under Japanese control within a few months after the Pearl Harbor
attack. The Japanese troops exploited natural and human resources from Southeast
Asia as did the Europeans. The cruel Japanese occupation policy provoked rising
anti-Japanese movements and guerrilla activities. The Allied Forces conquered the
Japanese forces after five years of strife, and World War II ended. Thailand canceled
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its alliance with Japan and participated with the Allied Forces just before the end of the
war.
The End of Colonialism and Independence of the Colonies
European colonial powers landed in Southeast Asia again after Japanese
Imperialism collapsed; however, Southeast Asian people opposed recolonization.
Anti-Japanese movements during the war became anti-imperialist and anti-colonist
movements (Bastin, 1968, & Pluvier, 1974). The Philippines became independent in
1946. Indonesia and Vietnam declared their independence and fought with the
Netherlands and France. Indonesia became sovereign in 1949 after a four-year war of
independence. Britain prepared for its colonies to become independent. The
Federation of Malaya was formed as a British autonomous state in 1948 and became
independent in 1959 (Hagiwara, 1988, & Lee, 1981). Colonialism diminished after
World War II and European colonial powers withdrew from Southeast Asia by the
1960s.
The Cold War in Southeast Asia
The Beginning of the Cold War in Asia
After World War II ended, the conflict between the United States and the Soviet
Union escalated. The Cold War broke out in Europe right after the world war but did
not emerge simultaneously in Asia. A time lag existed between Europe and Asia in the
escalation of the ideological conflict (Kokubun, 1993).
British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill announced that "an iron curtain"
had divided Europe into the capitalist and communist sides in 1946. United States
President Truman produced the Containment Policy to prevent Soviet expansionism in

41
1947. On the other hand, the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin in 1948 and opposed the
Western world. The ideological conflict quickly escalated in Europe.
In contrast, the Cold War did not escalate seriously in Asia until 1950
(Kokubun, 1993). Although Northern Korea was under Soviet control, the United
States withdrew most of its troops and weapons from South Korea. In China the
National Party fought with the Chinese Communist Party after World War II. The
Chinese Communist Party took power in 1949 and communist China was established.
The United States was worried about the establishment of Red China but the American
leaders did not recognize the formation of communist China as an expansion of Soviet
commumsm.
However, the United States did recognize China as a part of the Soviet
communist bloc when the People's Republic of China concluded the Sino-Soviet
alliance in February 1950 (Buss, 1985, & Kokubun, 1993).

The American

government decided to give military aid to France which was fighting Vietnamese
communist troops in May 1950. Moreover, the Korean War broke out in June 1950.
The North Korean communist troops, supported by the Soviet Union and China,
clashed with the United Nations forces that were comprised mainly of U.S. troops.
The Cold War emerged as a "hot war" in Asia (Kokubun, 1993, p. 46).
Containment of China
The Cold War in Asia was a conflict between the United States and communist
China (Kokubun, 1993). Intended to contain Chinese expansion, bilateral security
treaties between the United States and Asian countries were embodiments of the
Containment Policy. The United States concluded a security treaty with Thailand in
September 1950, the Philippines in August 1951, Japan in September 1951, and South
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Korea in October 1953. The Australia, New Zealand and the United States Security
Treaty (ANZUS) was established as a collective security treaty in 1951.
The United States regarded the Indochina War as a battle on the edge of the
expanding communist bloc rather than the Vietnamese war of independence from
France (Marr, 1981). The United States gave financial and military aid to France.
Capitalist Vietnam declared independence in 1955 and opposed North Vietnam. The
American government supported the South Vietnamese government and its strong
anticommunist policy. The Vietnam Labor Party established the South Vietnam
National Liberation Front (NLF) in 1960 and the NLF fought against the South
Vietnamese troops in the South.
ASEAN Countries and SEATO
Right after communist Vietnamese troops defeated France, the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization was established to contain expansion of the Chinese threat in 1954
(Leifer, 1989, & Lim, 1984). The Philippines and Thailand participated in SEATO.
The Philippines kept a "special relationship" with the United States as a clear
Western ally (lndorf, 1989, p. 107). The Philippines sent troops to the Korean and
Vietnam Wars. The Philippines, located in the Western Pacific Ocean, was strategically
important to the United States. The American government needed bases in the
Philippines to continue with its Containment Policy and it gave financial aid to the
Philippine government in order to keep the tie (Hanks, 1989, & Indorf, 1989).
Thailand, a part of the Indochina Peninsula, was directly threatened by
communist China and Vietnam and, like the U.S., wanted to avoid communist
expansion (Viraphol, 1983). The Viet Minh attacked Cambodia and Laos in 1954 and
threatened Thailand. The Thai government took only two days to decide to participate
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in SEATO after the United States announced the plan to establish SEATO (Morrison,
1981). The headquarter of SEATO was established in Bangkok. The Thai government
approved Bao Dai Vietnam supported by France in 1950 and opposed communist
Vietnam. Thailand also sent its troops to the Korean War in the same year.
Although SEATO was a military alliance in Southeast Asia, the United States
and European members dominated decision making in this organization (Simon, 1982).
SEATO did not respond to the Laotian Civil War between 1960 and 1962. Thailand
traditionally opposed Vietnam indirectly by manipulating the Cambodian and Laotian
governments. Disputes between the right and left wing groups in Laos were of import
to Thailand (Morrison, 1981). The Thai government explained the special relationships
between Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam to the other SEATO members. Thailand wanted
SEATO to use military power to solve the Laotian issue but European SEATO members
opposed military intervention. SEATO was unable to solve the sensitive traditional
conflict between Thailand and Vietnam (Leifer, 1989, & Yamakage, 1991). After
European members opposed military intervention in the Laotian civil war, the
Philippines and Thailand doubted the capabilities of a SEATO controlled by non
Southeast Asian countries (Yamakage, 1991).
SEATO for Malaya and Indonesia
When Malaya became independent from Britain in 1957, the Malayan
government did not intend to participate in SEATO (Morrison, 1981). If Malaya did
participate in SEATO, Chinese communist guerrilla activities would arise in Malaya.
Threat of the Chinese guerrilla forces could stimulate Malay nationalism causing ethnic
conflicts between these two races (Jeshurun, 1985).
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Another reason Malaya did not join SEATO was that it was not worried about
attacks from Chinese or Vietnamese armies invading from the northern border; Thailand
was a member of SEA TO and formed a barrier in the North Malay Peninsula
(Morrison, 1981). However, Malayan defense capabilities were too small to defend it.
Although Malaya did not participate in SEATO, it did form the Anglo-Malayan Defense
Agreement with Britain as a member of the Commonwealth in 1957. The Malayan
government deemed that AMDA produced enough defense capabilities for Malayan
national security (Jeshurun, 1985). Thus Malaya connected with the Western bloc
through AMDA, but not SEATO, avoiding being a clear Western ally in order to avoid
domestic ethnic conflicts.
Indonesia did not feel serious external threats, in contrast to Thailand and
Malaya, and did not have security treaties with foreign countries (Wanandi, 1983).
Indonesia is geographically distant from China and Vietnam. The Indonesian National
Forces defeated the Dutch troops in 1949 after a four-year battle. That war experience
gave Indonesia confidence in its own defense capabilities and formed strong
nationalism (Tas, 1974). Indonesians disagreed with the ideas and policies of the great
powers and rejected joining either the Eastern or Western blocs. Indonesia was
worried about the two blocs controlling it through the framework of the Cold War.
When the Korean War broke out, Jakarta made no comment supporting either side
(Leifer, 1983). Also, the Indonesian government approved neither Bao Dai Vietnam,
bucked up by France, nor the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, supported by
communist countries. Indonesia tried to be self-dependent and a nonaligned country.
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Establishment of Regional Organizations
ASA as the First Regional Organization
The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), established in 1961, is considered the
first regional organization established by and for the Southeast Asian countries
(Antolik, 1990, McCloud, 1986, & Yamakage 1991). ASA included the Federation of
Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand. Malaya and the Philippines had connected with
their former suzerain states more than with neighboring countries before the
establishment of ASA (Yamakage, 1991). How and why did the Southeast Asian
countries establish ASA?
The establishment of ASA was an initial stage of communication and mutual
understanding among the Southeast Asian countries (Yamakage, 1991). There was a
common recognition of regional security issues among the three member states of ASA.
For example, internal communist guerrilla forces were common problems (Antolik,
1990). In addition, the crisis in Laos during the early 1960 and the ineffectiveness of
SEATO promoted a need for a strong regional organization to resolve regional issues
(Antolik, 1990, & Gregor, 1989).
Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Malaya,
was an important person who contributed to the establishment of ASA. He was
concerned about the expansion of communist guerrilla forces in the country (Antolik,
1990). He thought that the weak Malayan economy was giving an opportunity to
guerrilla forces to expand their domestic influence (Suzuki, 1982, & Yamakage, 1991).
Economic growth and individual wealth were considered effective in removing citizen
support for the communists. In his viewpoint, regional economic cooperation was
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necessary to develop a strong Malayan economy. The Prime Minster named his plan
the Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFEf) (Leifer, 1989).
Carlos P. Garcia, President of the Philippines, had his own plan for regional
cooperation.

When President Garcia announced his foreign policy in 1958, he

introduced his plan for political and economic re�ional cooperation to oppose
communist attacks by establishing a strong organization in this region (Yamakage,
1991).
There were two main differences in their ideas: membership and the field of
cooperation (Yamakage, 1991).

Rahman's SEAFET plan (Malaya) included the

following: (a) members--the capitalist and nonalignment countries, and (b) fields-
cooperation in fields of economy and culture. Garcia's plan (the Philippines) included:
(a) members--only the capitalist countries, and (b) fields--cooperation in fields of
economy and politics. Both Rahman and Garcia agreed that economic and cultural
cooperation was necessary. After the meeting they announced the Rahman-Garcia plan
which emphasized that cultural cooperation and establishment of a regional organization
were necessary to solve common problems among the Southeast Asian nations.
Thailand responded well to the Rahman-Garcia plan; but the Thai government
produced yet another plan for regional cooperation (Yamakage, 1991): (a) members-
the capitalist and nonalignment countries; and (b) fields--cooperation in fields of
economy, society, culture, and science. The Thai government introduced this plan to
Southeast Asian countries in July 1959. The Thai regime wanted to establish a system
that would increase cooperation among the Southeast Asian countries to oppose
communists (Yamakage, 1991).

Bangkok was willing to establish a regional

organization and to sustain relations with the United States and SEATO.
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Prime Minister Rahman announced his willingness to establish the Association
of Southeast Asian States (ASAS) formed with Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand
in 1960. This announcement was made after the Philippines and Thailand agreed to the
ASAS plan (Yamakage, 1991).

The plan posed establishment of a regional

organization to cooperate mainly in the field of economies without any formation of a
mutual treaty (Antolik, 1990, and Yamakage, 1991). This blueprint became the basis
of the ASA Declaration in 1961.
The idea of anticommunism was downplayed in this plan to encourage
nonaligned Southeast Asian countries to participate in ASAS. South Vietnam was
willing to participate in the ASAS plan. However, it was removed from the list of
initial ASAS member countries because it was clearly an anticommunist country.
Participation of South Vietnam in the ASAS plan was considered an obstacle to
promoting participation of the Southeast Asian nonaligned countries (Yamakage,
1991).
The nonaligned countries, such as Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Laos, saw
ASA as a Western and anticommunist organization (Antolik, 1990, Frost, 1990, &
Leifer, 1989). Indonesia especially was a leader of the Asian and African nonaligned
countries in rejecting ASA. Yamakage (1991) states that Indonesian President Achamet
Sutan Sukarno preferred to deal in the international arena more than in the Southeast
Asian region. In addition, ASA was initiated by the smaller nations' leaders in
Southeast Asia and Sukarno, a leader of a Southeast Asian power, chose not to join
such an organization.
The ASAS plan was realized by the establishment of the Association of
Southeast Asia along with Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand in 1961. The foreign
ministers of the three countries declared that ASA did not connect with any external
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bloc or military alliance and did not oppose communist countries (Yamak:age, 1991).
Finally, no Southeast Asian nonaligned country participated in ASA, although ASA
was the first truly regional organization in Southeast Asia.
The Sabah Territorial Issue
Right after ASA was established, it failed in 1963 due to the escalation of the
Malaysian dispute with Indonesia and with the Philippines (Frost, 1990, & Leifer,
1989). Initially, a territorial issue between Malaya and the Philippines caused the
dispute.
Malaysia and the Philippines have serious differences over the territorial issue of
Sabah in Northern Borneo. The Sabah territorial issue emerged when Britain prepared
for the independence of Malaysia, including Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore.
The government of the Philippine, claimed Sabah and sought to deny it to Malaysia
(Seekins, 1984).
According to the Philippine government, Sabah belonged to the Sultan of Sulu,
in the Southern Philippines (Seekins, 1984). The Sultan lent the land of Sabah to a
British company in 1874. Although the land right transferred from the company to the
British government, the territory of Sabah had not been yielded by the Sultan of Sulu.
The Philippine government insisted that Sulu be a part of the Philippines and that the
British government should return British Sabah to the Philippines and not include it in
the new Malaysian federation.
Diosdado Macapagal made the Sabah issue an important issue in the presidential
campaign and the popular appeal won him the election in 1961 (Seekins, 1984). While
nationalist movements arose in the Philippines during the early 1960s, Macapagal
insisted on the territorial rights of the Philippines in Sabah to gain political support.
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Public opinion required President Macapagal to ensure Philippine sovereignty in Sabah
after the election. The British Ambassador to the Philippines warned that the territorial
issue might hurt the relations between the two countries in 1962 (Yamakage, 1991).
However, Macapagal insisted on Philippine sovereignty. The Sabah territorial issue
was an election issue for Macapagal but shifted to a diplomatic one. Both Britain and
the Philippines were members of SEATO and did not want the issue to hurt their
diplomatic relations. However, President Macapagal could not calm Philippine public
opm1on.
President Macapagal produced a plan to establish a great Malay union instead of
the Malaysia plan.

Ethnically speaking, Malaya and the Philippines are Malay

dominant countries. He insisted on national self-determination and cooperation of all
Malays. Macapagal tried to establish a union of Malay countries. He wanted to solve
the territorial issue as a domestic issue in the Malay union (Yamakage, 1991).
However, the Malayan government recognized Macapagal's plan as a ploy to keep his
presidential seat. On the other hand, the Philippine government negotiated with the
British government about the territorial issue but the negotiations failed. The British
and Malayan governments went on to form Malaysia and ignored the Malay union plan.
Kuala Lumpur and Manila criticized each other and the Sabah territorial issue escalated
the Malaysian dispute.
The Malaysian Dispute and Failure of ASA
The Sabah territorial issue, the rebellion of TNKU in Brunei, and the great
Malay union plan caused the intervention of Indonesia in the independence issue of
Malaysia. Indonesia recognized itself as a leader of the newly independent countries
after the Indonesian Independence War (Antolik, 1990, Frost, 1990, & Leifer, 1989).
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The Indonesian government insisted on anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and national
self-determination. Initially, Indonesian President Sukarno saw the independence of
Malaysia as decolonization of British Colonies in Southeast Asia (Nagai, 1986, & Tas,
1974).
However, Sukarno began to doubt the true independence of Malaysia and
viewed it instead as the formation of a new British colony when he saw turbulence in
Brunei and Sabah (McCloud, 1986, & Suzuki, 1982). Indonesia condemned Britain
for suppressing national self-determination movements in Brunei and criticized Malaya
for supporting the British policy. Subandria, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia,
announced President Sukarno's Confrontation Policy in which Indonesia confronted
Malaya's colonialism and imperialism in January 1963 (Yamakage, 1991).
Philippine President Macapagal asked Sukarno to cooperate with the Philippines
to avoid the independence of Malaysia in early 1963 (Yamakage, 1991). However,
Malaysia became independent in September 1963; then Malaya and the Philippines
broke off diplomatic relations. The diplomatic break paralyzed ASA. Moreover, the
absence oflndonesia was fatal to the management of ASA (Huxley, 1990, & McCloud,
1986).
Although ASA was paralyzed, its formation was significant for regional
cooperation in the long run. During the process of establishing ASA, the Southeast
Asian countries began to talk with each other about regional cooperation (McCloud,
1986). Moreover, even after the failure of diplomatic relations between Malaya and the
Philippines, both countries kept communications open through ASA (Leifer, 1989).
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The Independence of Malaysia, and Maphilindo
The independence issue of Malaysia debilitated ASA; however, the issue
produced another regional organization named Maphilindo. Maphilindo, a "Great
Malay Confederation," was formed with the three Malay states, Indonesia, Malaya, and
the Philippines (Irvine, 1982). They held a meeting in Manila in July 1963 and agreed
to establish a regional Malay-oriented organization (Irvine, 1982). The agreement was
known as the Manila Declaration. Indonesia and the Philippines tried to resolve the
Malaysian dispute through Maphilindo (Antolik, 1990, McCloud, 1986, & Suzuki,
1982). In contrast, Malaya was wanting to use the new regional organization to
establish Malaysia (Yamakage, 1991).
When Malaysia gained independence in September 1963, Indonesia and the
Philippines did not approve. However, the Malaysian government insisted that its
independence did not need the approval of neighboring countries as Malaysia was an
extension of Malaya (Yamakage, 1991). In the same month, both Indonesia and the
Philippines broke off diplomatic relations with Malaya.

After that Maphilindo

collapsed. This showed how easily a regional organization without a common purpose
could dissolve (Irvine, 1982, & McCloud, 1986). Although Maphilindo failed, its
establishment produced two significant outcomes.
First, Indonesia needed regional cooperation while establishing Maphilindo
(McCloud, 1986, & Yamakage, 1991).

When ASA was established, Indonesia

declined to join it. Indonesia acted as a leader among world nonaligned countries but
was not interested in joining a regional cooperation. Indonesia, skeptical of Malaysia's
new "independence", wanted to redraw the boundaries, excluding Britain's input.
Indonesia then decided to act as a Southeast Asian country, but not as a leader among
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the nonaligned countries. Indonesia's regional involvement in Maphilindo was an
important condition for the formation of ASEAN.
Second, Sukarno gave up strict Indonesian neutrality and anti-imperialism.
Indonesia had kept its distance from the countries allied with the West such as Malaya
and the Philippines (McCloud, 1986, & Yamakage, 1991). Indonesian participation in
Maphilindo meant that Indonesia had established a closer relationship with these
Western-allied countries.
Indonesia's Confrontation With Malaysia and Singapore
Indonesia did not accept the existence of Malaysia and tried to crush it. The
Indonesian forces attacked Malaysian territories and ships. Indonesian troops crossed
over the border in Borneo and entered Eastern Malaysia (Nagai, 1986, & Seekins,
1983). They fought with the Malaysian troops. Terrorist activities by the Indonesian
Guerrilla Forces also escalated in Malaysia. The British and U.S. Air and Naval
Forces intervened in the dispute and prevented escalation of the fighting (Morrison,
1981). The Malaysian government criticized Indonesia at United Nations meetings.
Indonesia viewed the United Nations as dominated by great powers and withdrew from
it in 1964 (Nagai, 1986, & Seekins, 1983).
Singapore separated from Malaysia during the Malaysian dispute and Indonesia
also confronted Singapore. Indonesia, where strong Malay nationalism existed, did not
allow the independence of Singapore, which was dominated by the ethnic Chinese
(Tas, 1974). The Indonesian forces blockaded Singapore, where the economy relied
on international trade (Morrison, 1981). The Indonesian guerrilla forces entered the
city of Singapore and committed terrorist acts.
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Escalation of the Vietnam War
While Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore were involved in their own security
issues during the early 1960s, the battle'in South Vietnam escalated into a war between
North Vietnam and the United States. Although the United States supported South
Vietnamese troops, they could not defeat communist guerrilla forces in South Vietnam.
The Soviet Union and China supported the communist forces in Vietnam. The United
States sent troops to Vietnam beginning in 1965 and fought with the South Vietnam
National Liberation Front and the North Vietnam Army (NVA). The U.S. forces
struck at North Vietnam that supported NLF.
The Philippines and Thailand directly supported the U.S. troops fighting in
Vietnam. War planes took off from U.S. bases in Thailand to attack North Vietnam.
Although Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos did not allow the U.S. Forces to
strike from the Philippines, the U.S. Air and Navy Bases in the Philippines backed up
the U.S. military operations in Vietnam (Hanks, 1989, & Lopez, 1985).
Formation of ASEAN
Lessons From the Failure of ASA and Maphilindo
Neither ASA nor Maphilindo succeeded and neither organization directly led to
ASEAN. However, each Southeast Asian country did learn from the failure of the
former regional organizations. Leaders recognized the existence of regional issues that
had caused crucial disputes (Antolik, 1990). They also learned that mutual suspicion
and poor communication channels were obstacles to resolving regional disputes
(Yamakage, 1991). When the Malaysian dispute occurred, Malaya and the Philippines
could communicate through ASA although they had broken off diplomatic relations. In
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addition, Thailand acted as a mediator between Malaya and the Philippines in the
organization (Leifer, 1989).

In contrast, all member states of Maphilindo were

involved in the dispute; yet Maphilindo could not resolve the issue. The failure of
Maphilindo also showed that a common interest among the member states was
necessary t o maintain a regional organization (Yamakage, 1991).

Regional

communication channels and the existence of mediators were needed to manage
regional issues.

Valuable experiences from the failure of the former regional

organizations contributed to the establishment of ASEAN.
End of the Malaysian Dispute
Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal began the move toward normalization
between Malaysia and the Philippines in 1964 (Yamakage, 1991). Macapagal was also
concerned about Indonesia. Sukarno was rapidly conp.ecting with communist China
(McCloud, 1986). Macapagal met Rahman in Cambodia in February 1964, and they
agreed to improve their relations (Y amakage, 1991).

Both countries established

consulates with each other in May 1994. Ferdinand E. Marcos, opposing the territorial
claim of Sabah, took presidential power of the Philippines in December 1965 (Leifer,
1989). He reestablished diplomatic relations with Malaysia in 1966.
Military rebellion in Indonesia in 1965 removed Sukarno from power and made
Suharto the new national leader. He pushed for normalization between Indonesia and
Malaysia. These two countries formed an agreement of diplomatic normalization in
August 1966 and reestablished diplomatic relations in August 1967 (Yamakage, 1991).
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The Beginning of ASEAN
After the Philippines reestablished diplomatic relations with Malaysia, ASA
resumed its activities in 1966. The member states of ASA wanted Indonesia to behave
as a Southeast Asian country, an equal with the other regional countries, but not as
leader of the nonaligned countries (Yamakage, 1991). · President Suharto established a
new diplomatic policy, suggesting Indonesia was willing to cooperate with neighboring
countries (McCloud, 1986, & Y amakage, 1991). The absence of Indonesia had been a
major reason for ASA's ineffectiveness (Huxley, 1990, & McCloud, 1986). The ASA
countries, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, considered establishment of a new
regional organization including Indonesia.

The three ASA countries contacted

Indonesia at the third foreign ministerial meeting of ASA in Bangkok in August 1966
(Irvine, 1982). After that meeting, leaders of the ASA countries visited Jakarta and
negotiated the formation of a new regional organization.
The new plan of organization started as the Southeast Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SEAARC). Khoman Thanat, the Thai Minister of Foreign
Affairs, proposed a Draft Joint Declaration to establish SEAARC in December 1966.
The draft was based on the ASA Declaration in 1961 and Indonesia's nonalignment
policy. Major subjects discussed in the draft of the SEAARC plan were the inclusion
of member states and the purposes of the new regional organization.
Expanding the membership was significant in establishing the new regional
organization. Adam Malik, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, visited
Burma and Cambodia in May 1967 to push these nonaligned countries to participate in
the new regional organization (Irvine, 1982). However, he failed to persuade them.
The participation of Singapore, opposed by Malaysia, was another issue (Yamakage,
1991). Nevertheless, Singapore was approved to participate in the new organization.
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The final meeting to establish the new organization was held in Bangsaen near
Bangkok in August 1967. The purpose of the new regional organization was the main
topic of the meeting. Indonesia insisted on political cooperation among the member
countries to respond to regional issues (Yamakage, 1991). The Philippines and
Singapore opposed this and insisted that economic cooperation be the main purpose of
the new organization. Finally, the purpose stated in the ASEAN Declaration was: "To
promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the
economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields" (Broinowski,
1982 p. 271). Political cooperation was not included in the declaration, but political
and regional security issues were unofficially focused on as the main subjects of
ASEAN.
Another issue raised at the Bangsaen meeting was the presence of foreign
troops in this region. Indonesia required the other countries to expel foreign military
forces from their countries (Irvine, 1982). The Philippines opposed forcing the U.S.
troops to leave (Irvine, 1982). Thanat tried to persuade Narciso Ramos, the Philippine
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, by saying that the expulsion of foreign troops did not
require any deadline (Yamakage, 1991).

That approach worked.

Indonesia also

recognized the importance of the U.S. military bases for regional security and did not
require the Philippines to close the U.S. bases, although the Philippines agreed in
principle. The problem of foreign military forces stationed in the ASEAN countries is
mentioned in the ASEAN Declaration:
AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with
the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not
intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national
independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly
processes of their national development (Broinowski, 1982 p. 270).
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Establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was declared in
Bangkok on August 8, 1967. Yamakage (1991) points out the correlation of the ASA
Declaration and the Manila Declaration to the ASEAN Declaration. The purposes of
ASEAN include most of the purposes of ASA. However, some important differences
exist in the declarations. The important points in the preface of the ASEAN Declaration
are that
MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and common problems
among the countries of South East Asia and convinced of the need to
strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and
cooperation.
DESIRING to establish a firm foundation for common action to
promote regional cooperation in South East Asia in the spirit of equality
and partner ship and thereby contribute toward peace progress and
prosperity in the region (Broinowski, 1982 p. 270).
The other outlined purposes of ASEAN in the declaration are to:
1. Accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in
the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to
strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South East
Asian nations.
2. Promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and
the rule of law in the relationship among the countries of the region and adherence to
the principles of the United Nations charter (Broinowski, 1982 p. 271).
According to Y amakage, these statements are original statements of the ASEAN
Declaration and are not stated in the ASA Declaration and the Manila Declaration. The
statements emphasize friendship and regional peace.

The declaration shows a

willingness and a desire of the member countries for a prosperous and peaceful
community in Southeast Asia.
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Regional Security and the Roles of ASEAN
Political Issues and ASEAN
ASEAN repeatedly claimed it was an economic and cultural organization but not
a political organization or a military alliance. The member countries also emphasized
differences between ASEAN and SEATO (Simon, 1982, & Yamakage, 1991).
However, the actual chief function of ASEAN was to negotiate political issues,
especially regional security issues (Antolik, 1990, Leifer, 1989, McCloud, 1986, &
Yamakage, 1991). Political cooperation between or among nation-states was a very
sensitive subject in the conflicts between the East and West during the Cold War era.
Each of the ASEAN countries had a different political position in the region. The
Philippines and Thailand participated with the Western allies, while Indonesia was a
nonaligned country.

However, all ASEAN countries agreed on an anticommunist

domestic policy (Irvine, 1982, & Simon, 1982). As a result, the communist countries
criticized ASEAN as an anticommunism organization. Initially, the ASEAN countries
denied being an anticommunist political organization so as not to arouse these
communist countries (Miyake, 1993). Although the ASEAN countries officially denied
political cooperation, they did strengthen their political ties.
ASEAN was the main communication channel among the Southeast Asian
countries, which resulted in decreased friction between and among ASEAN countries.
Unofficial foreign ministerial meetings of ASEAN were key to how ASEAN worked to
resolve regional issues, and political issues were negotiated at unofficial meetings.
Yamakage (1991) has examined these official and unofficial ASEAN meetings.
ASEAN held 29 meetings between 1967 and 1977. Yamakage analyzed 20 of those
meetings. Yamakage counts an issue negotiated at a meeting as one unit. The 20
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meetings, (11 official and 9 unofficial) produced 106 units. Fifty-six units (53%) were
about politics. Political topics shared 28% at 11 official meetings. In contrast, 90% of
the topics at the 9 unofficial meetings were political issues. Figure 1 graphs the share
of political topics at official and unofficial meetings between 1967 and 1977. The
ASEAN members negotiated nonpolitical issues at official meetings and political issues
at unofficial meetings until the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord in 1976. Y amak:age
explains why political topics shared large portions of the first and second official
meetings. While ASEAN had not systematically organized official and unofficial
meetings for political and nonpolitical topics, political issues were also negotiated at
(the first and second) official meetings.
Political Topics

(%)
100

Unofficial Meetings

80

60
40
20

1967

1970

1975

(Year)

Figure 1. Share of Political Topics at the Foreign Ministerial Meetings of ASEAN.
Source: Y amakage, S. (1991). ASEAN. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, p. 147.
The Corregidor Event and Repeat of the Sabah Territorial Issue
Right after ASEAN was established, it faced crucial conflicts between Malaysia
and the Philippines. Muslim soldiers belonging to the Philippine task force were shot
dead because they opposed their senior officers on Corregidor Island, in Manila Bay.
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The Corregidor Incident was publicized in March 1968, and showed the existence of a
task force training base in the Philippines. The Malaysian government recognized the
incident as disclosure of a plan to invade Sabah and criticized the Philippine
government (Steingerg, 1994). The Philippines raised the Sabah territorial issue again
and enforced a territorial law called the "Sabah Annexation Law" in Malaysia
(Yamakage, 1991, p. 130). Relations between the countries worsened and both closed
their embassies in November 1968. Some observers were concerned that this dispute
between the two ASEAN countries would dissolve the new regional organization as it
did ASA (Yamakage, 1991).
Thanat, the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs, tried to resolve this issue through
ASEAN. He proposed holding a foreign ministerial meeting in Bangsaen where the
establishment of ASEAN was negotiated. Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister of
Malaysia, and Ramos, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, visited
Bangsaen in December 1968. They talked about the Sabah territorial issue with the
other ASEAN members. Razak and Ramos agreed to come to an understanding with
each other and consideration of the territorial issue was tabled.

Diplomatic

normalization between Malaysia and the Philippines was announced at the third Annual
Meeting of Foreign Ministers in December 1969. ASEAN had overcome the crisis.
Withdrawal of U.S. and British Forces
Failures of U.S. forces in Vietnam created anxiety among the ASEAN
countries. Although the U.S. forces dropped more bombs on North Vietnam than they
had dropped on anyone in World War II, the Vietnamese Communist Forces continued
to fight (SarDesai, 1992). The war became a serious burden to the American economy.
Domestic and international anti-Vietnam War movements increased and demanded the
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American government to end the war.

United States President Lyndon Johnson

recognized that U.S. forces could not win a victory over the South Vietnam National
Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese Army after communist troops attacked U.S.
bases and facilities in South Vietnam in 1968 during the Tet offensive (Sakurai, 1995).
The U.S. forces began to withdraw from Vietnam in 1969, and the withdrawal was
complete in 1973.
The British troops also began to withdraw from Southeast Asia at the end of the
1960s. In 1967 the British government announced it would withdraw its troops from
Malaysia and Singapore by the mid 1970s (Morrison, 1981). The British withdrawal
policy coincided with the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Vietnam and in 1968 the
British government advanced the deadline of the withdrawal to March 1971 (Obaid,
1985).

The Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement was revised and became the

Five-Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) in 1971. Commonwealth members Britain,
Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore, concluded this new collective
security treaty. The Australian, New Zealand, and United Kingdom Forces (ANZUK)
were established and stayed in Singapore (Tanizawa, 1981). However, the Australian
and British forces withdrew from Singapore by 1975.
United States-China Rapprochement
The U.S. approach to communist China and the initiation of communist China
into the United Nations as a permanent member of Security Council in October 1971
shocked Asian countries (Lie, 1985). United States-China rapprochement signaled the
end of the Containment Policy in Asia. U.S. President Richard Nixon decided to enter
diplomatic relations with China without consulting his Asian allied countries.
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ZOPFAN
Withdrawal of the British and U.S. forces from Malaysia, Singapore, and
Vietnam and the announcement of the United States-China rapprochement caused
serious security problems in ASEAN countries, especially Thailand (Viraphol, 1983).
Malaysia produced a neutralization policy in which the national security of Southeast
Asian countries shifted from relying on external powers to relying on regional
cooperation (Jeshurun, 1985).

Although some members criticized the plan as

unrealistic, the neutralization plan announced a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality
(ZOPFAN) free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers" through
the Kuala Lumpur Declaration in 1971 (Broinowski, 1982, p. 295). ZOPFAN became
the first step that demonstrated the political cooperation of the ASEAN countries
(Yamakage, 1991).
Communization of Indochina's Three Countries
The main issue of ASEAN after the ZOPFAN Declaration was the stability of
Indochina after the Vietnam War (Thayer, 1990). The end of the Vietnam War and
relations of the three noncommunist countries in Indochina, Cambodia, Laos and South
Vietnam, were important issues for ASEAN (Thayer, 1990). The three countries
would be buffers between North Vietnam and the ASEAN countries (Yamakage,
1991). ASEAN invited the three Indochina countries to the Annual Meeting of Foreign
Ministers and to unofficial meetings and introduced a plan to support rebuilding the
three countries. The ASEAN Coordinating Committee on the Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation of Indochina States (ACCRRIS) was established at the sixth Annual
Meeting of Foreign Ministers in April 1973. However, communization of the three
Indochina countries in April 1975 shattered the efforts of ASEAN.
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The Declaration of the ASEAN Concord
It was essential to show cooperation among the ASEAN countries against the
communization of Indochina. Heads of the ASEAN countries gathered in Bali Island,
Indonesia, in February 1976 and produced the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. The
declaration reveals that the chief purpose of ASEAN was to pursue political stability in
the region (Frost, 1990, & Yamakage, 1991). Later, political cooperation was
officially included in the purposes of ASEAN (Frost, 1990, & Irvine, 1982).
Signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia was the first
officially political action taken by ASEAN. The core of the treaty is peaceful settlement
of disputes as stated below:
The High Contracting Parties shall have the determination and good
faith to prevent disputes. In case disputes on matters directly affecting
them should arise, especially disputes likely to disturb regional peace
and harmony, they shall refrain from the threat or use of force and shall
at all times settle such disputes among themselves through friendly
negotiations.
To settle disputes through regional processes, the High Contraction
Parties shall constitute, as a continuing body, a High Council
comprising a Representative at ministerial level from each of the High
Contracting Parties to take cognizance of the existence of disputes or
situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony.
In the event no solution is reached through direct negotiations, the High
Council shall take cognizance of the dispute or the situation and shall
recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement
such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation. The High
Council may however offer its good offices, or upon agreement of the
parties in dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry
or conciliation. When deemed necessary, the High Council shall
recommend appropriate measures for the prevention of a deterioration of
the dispute or the situation (Broinowski, 1982 p. 275).
The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia has not yet been used to
resolve regional conflicts. The agreement reflects a goal for the member states to
accomplish rather than reinforcement of mutual security in this region. Although
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conflicts among the ASEAN countries remained, mutual suspicion among the countries
decreased, validating the pact among the members (Yamakage, 1991).
Cambodian Invasion and the China-Vietnam Dispute
Vietnam invaded and occupied Cambodia in 1978. Right after the Vietnamese
invasion, China, which supported the Cambodian government, invaded Vietnam in
retaliation in 1979. ASEAN countries, especially Thailand, appreciated the Chinese
invasion (Morrison, 1981). Thailand wanted China to contain the Vietnamese threat.
The Vietnamese troops entered Thailand to fight against the Khmer Rouge, Cambodian
anti-Vietnamese guerrilla forces.
Thailand preferred to be aligned with Cambodia, which possessed relatively
weak military forces (Antolik, 1990). In contrast, Indonesia and Malaysia preferred a
strong Vietnam to oppose the threat of China (Morrison, 1981). So they did not feel
threatened by Vietnam because they were not adjacent to it. Although the Vietnamese
threat was perceived differently by each ASEAN country, ASEAN could produce
compatible policies against Vietnam. The Vietnamese invasion promoted more
cooperation among the ASEAN countries.
After the Cold War
Withdrawal of Vietnamese Troops From Cambodia
The collapse of Cold War structures influenced Southeast Asia and ASEAN
memberships. The last Vietnamese troops were withdrawn from Cambodia in 1991.
The United Nations sent the Peacekeeping Forces to Cambodia in 1992. The United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established and the United
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Nations assumed Cambodian sovereignty until the end of the national election in 1993
(Rourke, 1993).
Territorial Issues in the South China Sea
Small islands and coral reefs in the South China Sea near China, Taiwan, the
Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam are other spots producing
regional issues after the Cold War. This area is not only an important sea lane
connecting Europe/the Middle East with East Asia but also containing rich oil and
natural gas deposits (You, 1994). Four ASEAN countries (Brunei, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Vietnam), China, and Taiwan insist on their territorial rights in some
or all of the islands. If a serious military dispute occurs in this area, the warfare
crucially influences the sea lanes though the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea.
Trade is the lifeline of the Singaporean economy. Although Singapore is not involved
in the territorial issue, the island country, located between the Malacca Strait and the
South China Sea, would be surely damaged by a military dispute (Matsui, 1995). After
the Cold War, the territorial issue in the South China Sea became important to the
ASEAN counties.
Spratly and Paracel Islands were just coral reefs and islands in the South China
Sea before oil was discovered there. Japanese troops occupied these islands during
World War II. Spratly and Paracel Islands became part of Taiwan as territories of
Japan (Samuels, 1982). After the end of the war, Japan returned the territorial rights of
these islands to China (Taiwan). Taiwan and France sent troops to some islands to
retain them. Although the Beijing government insisted on the territorial rights in
Spratly and Paracel Islands, the government did not send troops there (You, 1994).
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The French forces withdrew from the islands during the 1950s and Vietnamese landed
and occupied them.
After American oil companies, such as Mobil and Shell, found oil in the South
China Sea during the end of the Vietnam War, the territorial disputes escalated
(Samuels, 1982). Chinese forces attacked the South Vietnamese troops staying in the
Paracel Islands, after the U.S. troops withdrew from Vietnam in 1974. Although the
U.S. forces stayed in the Philippines, on the eastern edge of the South China Sea, they
did not intervene in the military dispute. The Chinese troops occupied Paracel Islands
and built an airport. Meanwhile, the Philippine troops landed and occupied some of
Spratly Islands in 1971. The Philippines began to develop oil wells in this area and
built a landing strip in Thi-Tu Island by the end of the 1970s. Malaysia found natural
gas in Spratly Islands in 1974 and 1975, and began to produce gas (You, 1994).
The Spratly territorial issue escalated during the 1980s. Vietnam cooperated
with the Soviet Union and began to develop oil wells in the South China Sea (Matsui,
1995). In 1980 the Philippines occupied Commodore Reef in the Spratly Islands (Lo,
1989). Malaysia sent troops to Swallow Reef in 1983 and built a landing strip. Brunei
became independent in 1984 and insisted on its territorial right to the Spratly Islands.
The independence of Brunei made the territorial issue more complex. The Vietnamese
troops occupied eight of the Spratly islands and built a landing strip in 1984 (You,
1994). Vietnam began to produce oil in the South China Sea in 1986 (Tanri, 1992).
Finally, the Chinese Navy clashed with the Vietnamese Navy near Spratly Islands and
defeated the Vietnamese in 1988. China took six Spratly Islands from Vietnam. The
Soviet forces staying in Cam Ranh Bay, Southern Vietnam, did not intervene in the
military dispute.
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China enacted a territorial law and announced that all the South China Sea was a
Chinese territory in February 1992 (Baolin, 1992). The Chinese government sold a
mine lot in the South China Sea, called WAB-21, to Crestone Energy Corporation, an
American oil developer, in May 1992 (Xin, 1992). WAB-21 included three islands
where Vietnam claimed territorial rights. Meanwhile, the U.S. forces finished their
withdrawal from Subic Bay Navy Base in the Philippines in November 1992, and the
Russian forces withdrew most of their troops from Cam Ranh Bay in the early 1990s
(Tanri, 1992).

But over 2,000 soldiers from China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the

Philippines, and Vietnam were staying in the Spratly Islands in 1992.
ASEAN has taken the initiative to solve the territorial issue in the South China
Sea. The 25th ASEAN Foreign Ministerial meeting was held in Manila in July 1992.
The meeting produced a declaration stating that the territorial issue of the South China
Sea should be solved peacefully (Tasker, 1992).
ASEAN decided to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum to negotiate regional
security issues in 1993. The first ARF meeting was held in Bangkok in July 1994.
The six ASEAN countries, with Australia, China, Japan, Laos, Papua New Guinea,
Russia, the United States, and Vietnam, participated in the meeting. The escalation of
the Spratly Islands issue was a main subject of that meeting (Tasker, 1994).
Participation of Vietnam in ASEAN
ASEAN held its fourth summit meeting in Singapore and announced the
Singapore Declaration in 1992. This declaration reinforced political cooperation among
the members (Miyake, 1993). The declaration also cordially encouraged nonmember
Southeast Asian countries to participate in the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in
Southeast Asia. Laos and Vietnam signed the treaty in 1992. Vietnam became the
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seventh member of ASEAN in 1995. Vietnam's participation in ASEAN demonstrated
the end of a cold war between ASEAN and Vietnam.
Conclusion
Use of a simple bipolar frame, focusing on the East and West conflict, is an
obstacle in understanding current regional security issues in Southeast Asia. When the
European colonial powers covered Southeast Asia, this region was stable. However,
after World War II, Southeast Asia entered an unstable era. Relations among Southeast
Asian countries were complicated and unstable compared with those of European
countries during the Cold War. International and regional powers such as Britain,
China, Indonesia, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Vietnam interacted in this
region, forming a multipolar system. Their conflicts emerged as both cold and hot
wars in Southeast Asia.
Relatively weak Southeast Asian countries cooperated with external powers and
participated in regional organizations. Security treaties with Britain and the United
States, collective security treaties such as SEATO and AMOA, and regional
organizations such as ASA and ASEAN were systems for the national security of
Southeast Asian countries during the Cold War era.
Before the withdrawal of the U.S. and British military forces, the ASEAN
members had not produced coherent security policies. Because the ASEAN countries
had different national security perspectives, the frame of the Cold War was complicated
in Southeast Asia.
Thailand is a part of the Asian continent. China and Vietnam directly threatened
the sovereignty of Thailand. Thailand participated in SEATO and connected with the
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United States. The Thai forces maintained relatively strong military capabilities among
the ASEAN countries.
On the other hand, Vietnam and China did not threaten the Philippines because
the Philippines, an island country, was separated from the Asian continent. The
country kept special relations with the United States and participated in SEATO. The
Philippines and Thailand supported the U.S. military operations in Southeast Asia.
Former British colonial countries, Malaysia and Singapore, concluded security
treaties with Britain and relied on British forces. In addition, Malaysia was a free rider
of SEATO because Thailand, joining SEATO, prevented the threat of China and
Vietnam from advancing through Indochina and the Malay Peninsula.
Brunei and Singapore are small compared with their neighboring countries,
Indonesia and Malaysia. Brunei and Singapore were threatened by aggressive
neighboring countries rather by than the expansion of the communist bloc.
Indonesia and Vietnam, which had experienced heavy fighting with their
suzerain states, the Netherlands and France, formed strong anti-imperial ideologies.
Indonesia opposed joining either the Eastern or Western blocs and established a third
bloc--a group of nonaligned countries. In addition, escalation of the Vietnam War did
not produce a serious threat to Indonesia, located as it was away from Indochina.
Indonesia and Malaysia wanted a strong Vietnam, to reduce the Chinese threat. The
two countries were worried about the Chinese threat that interfered in Indonesia and
Malaysia through Chinese communist guerrilla forces.
Vietnam joined the Eastern bloc to become independent from France. The
Vietnam War had been a war of independence for the Vietnamese but the Cold War
transformed it into a battle between the East and West. The Soviet Union and China
supported the North Vietnamese and the war escalated.
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The Cold War was over in 1991. However, as one Southeast Asian cold war
ended during the 1970s, another cold war emerged. The United States clashed with
China and tried to contain the Chinese threat until the 1970s. President Nixon visited
China in 1972 and the Containment Policy became obsolete in Asia. Britain and the
United States recognized the value of decreasing their national interests in this region
and the British and U.S. fo rces withdrew from Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and
Vietnam during the early 1970s. SEATO, having contained the Chinese threat, was
dissolved in 1977.
ASEAN countries now had to protect themselves. Indochina's three countries
communized in 1975 and the Vietnam Communist Forces invaded Cambodia in 1978.
The Vietnamese forces stayed in Cambodia until 1989. No European or American
forces intervened in the incidents. ASEAN united with China to contain the Vietnamese
threat and fought against Vietnam during the 1980s. Vietnam participated in ASEAN in
1995 and this cold war too was over.
However, the next cold war emerged between ASEAN and China. In 1992 the
United States closed its military bases located on the Eastern edge of the South China
Sea in the Philippines.

During the early 1990s Russia also withdrew most of the

troops placed on the Western edge of the South China Sea in Vietnam. The Chinese
government claimed the South China Sea as a Chinese territory in 1992. China thus
exten�ed its hegemony to the South China Sea where four ASEAN countries also
asserted their territorial claims.
The importance of ASEAN has increased since the American and British
presence decreased in Southeast Asia after the 1970s. ASEAN is a regional
organization whose member countries possess different characteristics and polices.
Although ASEAN did not possess military capability, political cooperation among the
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ASEAN members responded to the crises in the Indochina Peninsula during the 1970s
and 1980s.
Although the ASEAN countries responded to common external threats and
worked as a security system in this region, ASEAN countries sometimes fought with
each other. Conflicts between the Philippines and Malaysia, Malaysia and Indonesia,
Malaysia and Singapore, and Singapore and Indonesia produced mini cold wars in this
region during the Cold War era. Most of the conflicts were caused by historical,
ethnic, and territorial issues, and the complicated composition of the Cold War in this
region promoted the conflicts. The frame of the international Cold War was only a thin
layer covering the fragmented structures of the ASEAN countries.

CHAPTER IV
SECURITY AND MILITARY POSTURING AMONG ASEAN MEMBERS
The Military Dimension: Individual and Collective Strategic Policy
For the ASEAN countries to manage their own security environment, they must
have defense capabilities within a regional setting. Sheldon W. Simon in ASEAN
Security in the 1990s (1989) states that the ASEAN countries shifted "from
predominant concern with internal insurgencies to the establishment of conventional
forces" during the 1970s (pp. 583-584). Air and naval forces in these countries began
to develop heavy weaponry capability during the mid and late 1970s as their economic
growth permitted increased military budgets.

Moreover, security issues among

ASEAN countries grew more serious during this period, promoting arms build-ups in
these countries (Morrison, 1981). Some ASEAN countries had respectable military
power by the late 1980s and upgraded their air and naval inventories in the 1990s.
On the other hand, the Vietnamese threat promoted bilateral military exercise
training among the ASEAN countries (Acharya, 1992, & Okabe, 1989). ASEAN has
been a security community but not a defense community. "The political will for greater
military integration is clearly lacking" among these countries, Acharya writes (1992, p.
15). However, the ASEAN countries have strengthened their military-security ties
through bilateral military exercises since 1972.

Figure 2 shows a record of

intra-ASEAN bilateral training exercises, between 1972 and 1986.
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1-5 times
6-10 times
11-15 times
Over 16 times

Philippines
* Including military exercises of the Five-Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA)
Figure 2. Intra-ASEAN Bilateral Exercises Between 1972 and 1986.
Source:

Okabe, T. (1989). ASEAN ni okeru kokumin tougou to chiiki tougou
[National and regional integration in ASEAN]. Tokyo: Kokusai Mondai
Kenkyu-syo, p. 150.

Bilateral military training exercises are effective not only to develop common military
operating procedures and tactics but also to standardize modes of command and
control. Moreover, these military training exercises can help to build cooperation with
neighboring countries and overcome mutual suspicion (Acharya, 1992). Post-1970s.
individual and collective defense policies of each ASEAN country are examined in this
chapter.
Brunei
Brunei has not built sufficient defense capability to respond to external threats.
The Royal Brunei Armed Forces has no fighter jets, frigates, or heavy/middle battle
tanks (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994). Although substantial oil
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royalties enabled Brunei to have an ample defense budget, its small population has
prevented the armed forces from expanding its capability.
The Royal Brunei Armed Force consists of volunteers. The youths of Brunei
are reluctant to participate in the armed force because the wealthy Brunei economy
produces more attractive working opportunities than does the defense sector. For
example, the Army is the core of the armed forces (77% of the total military personnel)
and Brunei is planning to establish three battalions. However, shortages in its work
force have impeded the accomplishment of this plan. Moreover, the Army is short of
personnel who can operate complex weaponry (Ebata, 1994b).
The British government had assumed responsibility for the security problems of
Brunei until its independence in 1984; yet Brunei keeps strong military ties to Britain
(Ebata, 1994b, & Weatherbee, 1986). A British Ghurka battalion remains in Brunei.
A British Task Force and Marines also periodically hold military training maneuvers in
Brunei's jungle. The military officers of Brunei are educated in Britain or Singapore.
Singapore has retained a close military relationship with Brunei because these
countries are in similar geopolitical circumstances. The Singaporean forces established
training bases in Brunei and approximately 500 Singaporean military personnel are
there (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994). The Royal Brunei Armed
Forces trained with the Singaporean forces six times between 1984 and 1986 (Okabe,
1989).
Brunei and Malaysia have strengthened their military ties. Malaysia permitted
the Royal Brunei Air Force to train in Malaysian air space. Both countries plan to
increase their bilateral military exercises.

Moreover, Malaysia asked Brunei to

participate in the Five-Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), a defense treaty formed
with four former British colonies and Britain (Simon, 1989).
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Finally, Brunei is willing to strengthen military relations with the United States.
The Royal Brunei Armed Force annually trains with U.S. forces.

The Brunei

government has plans to allow U.S. forces to use military facilities in Brunei and has
begun to enlarge Bandar Seri Begawan International Airport to make it available to
U.S. forces (Ebata, 1994b).
Indonesia
The Army dominates the Indonesian Armed Forces (Angkatan Bersenjata
Republik Indonesia, or ABRI) which has responded to internal insurgency (Ebata,
1994b, & Weatherbee, 1986). Although the Indonesian Army is the second largest in
ASEAN, it does not have heavy/middle battle tanks (see Figures 3 and 6). ABRI is
shifting to respond to external threats. Although anti-government guerrilla forces still
exist in Indonesia, their threats have weakened (Ebata, 1994b).
The principal modification of ABRI is to modernize the Air Force and Navy.
The Indonesian Air Force (Angkatan Udora Repulik Indonesia, or AURI) purchased
F-5 Tiger Ils and used A-4 Skyhawks during the 1970s (The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1994). AURI began to recondition these fighters and fighter/ground
attackers during the early 1980s (Ebata, 1994b, & Weatherbee, 1986). Indonesia has
since then introduced F-16 Falcons and Mk53 Hawks to replace its old F-Ss and A-4s.
They operate F-16s for air defense and Mk53s are used for ground and ship attacks.
AURI is also planning to purchase airborne early warning aircraft (AEW). The
president of AURI boarded one of Singapore's E-2C Hawkeyes, an AEW, to appraise
its capability (Ebata, 1994b). Another very important element of AURI is its transport
fleet. Because of geographical requirements, AURI has the most capable cargo
transportation ability among the ASEAN countries. Twenty-two C-13 0 Hercules
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aircraft, including two tankers, are at the core of the transport fleet (The International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994). AURI can send an airborne battalion anywhere
in this multiple islands' country and this ability is increasing (Ebata, 1994b).
The Indonesian Navy (ALRI) is becoming a technologically advanced force and
already possesses some interdiction capability (Weatherbee, 1986).

Traditionally,

Indonesia has had a capable navy. The quantity of frigates is the largest in ASEAN
and Indonesia is the only ASEAN country with submarines (The International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1994).

In addition, the Indonesian government decided to

purchase 42 former East German war ships, including three submarines, in 1991.
Kensuke Ebata (1994b), a correspondent of Jean's Defence Weekly, estimates that
ALRI will be the most capable navy in Southeast Asia.
ABRI led exercises with the other ASEAN countries (see Figure 2). "Indonesia
has been a key catalyst for intra-ASEAN bilateral exercises" Acharya reports (1991, p.
166).

According to Okabe (1989) of the 124 bilateral ASEAN military training

exercises recorded between 1972 and 1986, Indonesia participated 88 times.
Indonesia's bilateral military exercises with Malaysia (51 times) have been the most
comprehensive in ASEAN (Acharya, 1991, & Okabe, 1989).

Indonesian and

Singaporean military ties were also strengthened and these countries established a joint
bombing and combat exercise training range in Indonesia in 1991 (Ebata, 1994b).
Although Indonesia led intra-ASEAN bilateral military exercises, the Indonesian
government opposed military exercises and cooperation among the three countries.
Malaysia
The Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) shifted from counterinsurgency to
conventional warfare preparation due to changing internal and external circumstances.
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The Malaysian Communist Party was the main enemy of the MAF but that guenilla
force weakened and gave up in 1988 (Takashima, 1992).

On the other hand,

withdrawal of the British forces during the early 1970s, and the Vietnamese threat
increased the defense needs of Malaysia.

The total defense and security budget

expanded, nearly doubling, between 1979 and 1982 (Weatherbee, 1986). The size of
the MAF also expanded during the 1970s and 1980s (see Figures 3 through 6). The
MAF introduced Scorpion light tanks, F-5s, and A-4s in preparation for Vietnamese
aggression in these periods.
In 1988 Malaysia concluded the Anglo Malaysian MoU (named Project 88) with
Britain to modernize the MAF. The core plan was the renewal of air and sea defense
systems. The MAF ordered ten Hawk trainers and eighteen Hawk light attackers from
Britain to replace A-4s. These Hawks were scheduled for introduction between 1993
and 1995 (Ebata, 1994b). In addition, in 1993 the Malaysian government decided to
purchase eighteen MIG-29 Fulcrums from Russia and eight F-18 Hornets from the
United States instead of F-5s. F-18s possess long-distance ship attack capability. The
MIG-29 is the only jet fighter able to land on Swallow Reef in Spratly Islands in the
South China Sea. Malaysia became the first MIG user among the ASEAN countries.
However, Indonesia wanted Malaysia to purchase F-16s, as did Singapore and
Thailand, because IPTN, an Indonesian defense company, was willing to maintain the
F-16s of the ASEAN countries (Takashima, 1992). The company also stressed that
standardized weaponry systems were important for military cooperation in ASEAN.
The Malaysian government was willing to increase its naval capability and
contracted a British company to build two corvettes in 1992. These 2,270 ton corvettes
carry eight Exocet anti-ship missiles, sixteen Seawolf air-to-air missiles, and a Super
Lynx helicopter. Malaysia also ordered four submarines from Sweden in 1990.

78
1200000--.---------------------�

t,

---•'"-!'i...

-rr•�... .

•,I

��.

-�■-,j,_,'!, ... -

..

1000000 ---------;r=•�-----· · ____.....,...,.,.-------.
,.,/:
·-t

·.�-

.:,'/

!

·:.

,!/

�

800000-------;r·��·----------·��.----�

�

:-f

·��

�,}.

:·
�
;r
r

Brunei

Ill Indonesia
� Malaysia
� Philippines
11D Singapore

·.-:.�

�
�

■

ii Thailand
� Vietnam

�

�

600000-----.:•�·: ---------------��:�---.
1

�

:,:r

'•

�
�-

�
�

400000-+----- ------------ -----

""'

.....,.,......

,:,r/////,,.,,.,,.,,.,,,.,,.,,,,,.,,.,,,,.,,.,.,,,

-:@),�>>>')....�,r,,.<<<-..................................................................................................,,

"._-<f!,.'f,,.W..'
....
�
···················"
·
·
· ··· ········
0-4-------lcll.1&.Ll,l,l.....i,iiii,i____________.____

1969-70

1979-80

1989-90

1994-95

Figure 3. Army Personnel of ASEAN Countries.

■ Brunei

70000

Ill Indonesia

60000

� Malaysia

50000
40000 ·················--------�-��-�-...�..�
...�...�..�...�..�···�··:�··-:.....·�;r;,.�-...���-:.:-.�.�...����..'.;;:::..................

-�

J':-.--·--·· --

.--:··
......................j':•·..............................................................

30000

,,,,,,""�,,,,,,,"'-:

-- ..................

�
�,,,,,,,�.'!I
:---

20000+---=-----..,�,....
,����""" ..•:-���------------'
--·
•■
'!t.,
,
,,,�
...
,,,
//111,,,,.,,.,,.,,.,,,,.,,.,,.,,.,,.,,.,,,.
,u:/___________
..:·
_
10000 -+------,.......,s,,
•.,,:,r/77//✓,..,..,..
-:··

...

�,,

W� ■ I ■ I ■ I ■ I ■ I ■ I ■ I ■ I ■ I ■ I ■ I ■ I ■ I ■ 1 ■ 1 ■ I ■ I ■ I ■ I
�y.y.,s,{J ,_,_,,.,..7//////�7"/,
ft/�
._

0 -+------..-..ui.JLi.Ll.&1,11,;,;,;,;;..._______....______

1969-70

1979-80

1989-90

Figure 4. Navy Personnel of ASEAN Countries.

1994-95

� Philippines
III] Singapore
lil§IThailand
§I Vietnam

79
50000,---'0<--------------------

■

Brunei

Iii Indonesia
� Mal aysia

t§'iJ Philippines
20000

III) Singapore
.................. ·............................... �� ..--�.... -........................................_ .............. : 4...................

-..�... .,!.��,..,_),_;
-· .._.,.._;...,.,,...,.�.,..,..,..,.,.
.......�,........................................v.,///R.::............................................................
10000 ...................""�.._..•..._,c.
•
..--�,�

4.�rf�'-'-'''-''-'-"-�"(.:-:,-;--'.'-'-'-''-'-'-'-'-'-""-"-'''°'""-'''-''- ''-"V
- .....-....

�,...:;,�..ri:

.,.,.,•.,•/.•••••••············· ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
-;
.,.,
.,
.,
o+--___,..-L1J.11.i.:..;,;;.;,,;,..----...-----..--------■

��·:.

1969-70

V///fl .

"//-'/-'/-'//_,!';

1979-80

I

I

I

I

l!!i!IThailand
�Vietnam

I■I■ I■1 ■I■ I■ I■I■ I■ 11

1989-90

1994-95

Figure 5. Air Force Personnel of ASEAN Countries.

■

Thailand

Ill Vietnam

500 ....................

o

······································································································································

L-------���=::::::::�1969-70
1979-80
1989-90
1994-95

Figure 6. Heavy/Middle Tanks of ASEAN Countries.
Source:

Figure 3, 4 , 5, 6, 7, and 8 rely on the data of the sources below.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. (1994). Military balance 19941995. London: Author, pp. 169-193.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. (1989). Military balance 19891990. London: Author, pp. 156-179.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. (1989). Milita[Y balance 19791980. London: Author, pp. 64-74.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. (1989). Milita[Y balance 19691970. London: Author, pp. 44-50.
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However, due to insufficient funds, the Malaysian government canceled the submarine
order.
Malaysia has promoted military cooperation with ASEAN and non-ASEAN
countries. Malaysia conducted trainings with other ASEAN countries but without the
Philippines (see Figure 2). One obstacle to Malaysia and the Philippines training
together is the Sabah territorial issue (Okabe, 1989). Although Malaysia has jointly
held exercises with FPDA countries since 1972, Malaysia avoided bilateral military
exercises with Singapore until 1984. Malaysia also participates in military exercises
with French and U.S. forces.
The Philippines
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have probably been the least
affected by external threats. U.S. forces in the Philippines provided adequate defense
capability for national security. The AFP has responded to insurgency but is not
prepared for external threats. Its mobility is insufficient. The Philippine Navy is
essentially a coast guard and the Air Force mainly supports ground missions against the
New Peoples Army (Weatherbee, 1986). Weaponry systems have not changed since
the Vietnam War (Ebata, 1994b). AFP does not have radar defense systems. Although
the number of fighters and frigates has decreased since the 1980s, the Philippines have
not added new ones (see Figures 7 and 8). Seven F-5s is the total number of jet fighters
claimed by the Philippine Air Force between 1994 and 1995 (International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1994). However, the Air Force recognized that only two of them
were useable due to shortage of maintenance parts (Ebata, 1994b). The country's war
ships are at least 44 years old and none is equipped to handle missiles. The Philippine
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Source:

Figure 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 rely on the data of the sources below.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. (1994). Military balance 19941995. London: Author, pp. 169-193.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. (1989). Military balance 19891990. London: Author, pp. 156-179.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. (1989). Military balance 19791980. London: Author, pp. 64-74.
International Institute for Strategic Studies. (1989). Military balance 19691970. London: Author, pp. 44-50.
Navy is the only navy without a missile ship among the ASEAN countries (Ebata,
1994b).
The Philippine government began to modernize the AFP during the early 1990s.
The Philippine Army bought 150 Mk3s, British armored vehicles, in 1992.

The

government asked the British defense company to allow trade for these armored
vehicles, by bartering fish and seaweed, but the company ref used. Israel sold eighteen
used C-7 Kafirs to the Philippine Air Force in 1991.

In 1990 the Philippine

government ordered six missile craft from Australia and Spain. Each missile ship is
equipped with four Exocet missiles (Ebata, 1994b).
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The Philippines assumed a conservative attitude to bilateral military exercises
among the ASEAN countries. Although the other ASEAN countries formed networks
for military exercises, the AFP held exercises only with Indonesia between 1972 and
1986 (see Figure 2). Tatumi Okabe (1989) states that the Philippines' isolation in
intra-ASEAN military cooperation is significant. He mentions three reasons why the
Philippines formed weak military ties with the other ASEAN countries: (1) the
Philippines' geographical separation from the other ASEAN countries, (2) influence of
the Sabah territorial issue as the most serious conflict in ASEAN, and (3) the
Philippine-US. security treaty. However, the U.S. forces were withdrawn from the
Philippines in 1992, and then the Philippines supported bilateral military training
exercises with the other ASEAN countries.
Singapore
Because of Singapore's history and geopolitics, this country has maintained its
own defense capability since its independence. The Singapore security policy is to be
"the poison shrimp' or porcupine'--both small but dangerous animals to predators"
(Weatherbee, 1986, p. 206). It has modernized the weaponry and structure of the
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). Although the dominant weapons possessed by SAF
are not the latest models, the Singapore defense industry has continuously modernized
with more advanced weapons. Singapore has promoted its own domestic defense
industry and Singapore Defense Industries (SDI) is now ranked as the tenth largest
defense company in the world (Ebata, 1994b). SDI produces guns, artillery, and
bombs for domestic users and for export. The wealthy Singaporean economy and
high-tech industry can support its modem armed forces.
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SAF has accentuated its Air Force. Although it has the least number of airmen,
the Air Force possesses the second largest fleet of fighters and fighter/ground attackers
in ASEAN (see Figures 5 and 8). The Singapore Air Force is the most capable among
the ASEAN countries (Weatherbee, 1986). The dominant combat aircraft of the Air
Force are F5s and A-4s purchased during the 1970s and 1980s. These A-4s, first
produced in 1956, were upgraded with F-404 engines and new radar and fire control
systems. The upgraded A-4s, called Super Skyhawks, are new air-to-air fighters
(Simon, 1989). E-2Cs and F-16s, introduced since 1987 and 1988, also increased the
air defense capability of Singapore (Weatherbee, 1986).
The Singaporean economy relies on trade, so protecting the sea lanes is an
important task of SAF.

The Air Force introduced four Fokker 50 maritime

reconnaissance aircraft from the Netherlands during the early 1990s to replace
Skyvans.

Although the Singapore Navy has no frigates, it was the first missile

gunboat user in Southeast Asia. Singapore, supported by Israel, produced Sea Wolf
gunboats armed with Gabriel II anti-ship missiles during the 1970s (Ebata, 1994b, &
Weatherbee, 1986). They have equipped these gunboats with the U.S. Harpoon
anti-ship missiles instead of Gabriel Ils since the late 1980s.
Shortage of military training ranges is a serious problem for the Singapore Army
and Air Force.

As a result, they have established weapons training exercise and

military training ranges in other countries. Singapore established a main exercise
training range in Taiwan for a permanent military training facility. The SAF has also
trained in Australia, Brunei, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United
States. Indonesia provided the Singapore Air Force with a weapons training exercise
range in Sumatra Island for joint use of both countries (Simon, 1989). Singapore has
also held bilateral trainings with Malaysia since 1984. On the other hand, Singapore
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concluded a security accord with the United States in 1990 and began a maintenance
and supply agreement with the U.S. Air Force and Navy (Ebata, 1994b).
Thailand
Thailand built up its defense capability to oppose the Vietnamese threat. The
Army dominates the Royal Thai Armed Forces. The Thai Army was third largest
among the ASEAN countries (see Figure 3). Thailand introduced heavy/middle battle
tanks to oppose the Vietnam forces. M-48s are the main battle tanks of the Thai Army
(see Figure 6). During the 1980s Thailand strengthened ties with China and purchased
approximately 100 Chinese T-69 tanks at 10% to 30% of their market value (Simon,
1989). However, their unreliability and unsophisticated systems disappointed the Thai
Army. The Thai government deemed that the cheap Chinese tanks could not be the
main battle tanks to protect them from external threats. Thailand began to purchase
M-60 tanks from the United States in the early 1990s (Ebata, 1994b).
The Thai Navy is the largest navy in ASEAN and is expanding. Between 1969
and 1970 the Navy had 21,000 men. It expanded to 63,000 men between 1994 and
1995 (see Figure 4). The Thai Navy ordered six frigates from China during the 1980s.
The poor quality surprised the Thai forces. After China delivered the frigates to
Thailand, the Navy equipped them with American and German weapons systems and
engines. In addition, Thailand ordered a V/STOL aircraft carrier from a Spanish
company. That aircraft carrier is due to be delivered in 1997 and will be the only
aircraft carrier owned by a Southeast Asian country (Ebata, 1994b).
Thailand introduced eighteen F-16s, during the mid 1980s, that could strike
Vietnamese troops in Laos and Cambodia (Simon, 1989). The F-16s could oppose
Vietnam's MIG-23 Floggers. The Thai government ordered another eighteen F-16s
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during the early 1990s from General Dynamics (currently Lockheed Martin). The Thai
Air Force will establish two squadrons of F-16s (Weatherbee, 1986).
Thailand, with a security treaty with the United States, has held trainings with
U.S. forces. The annual Thai-U.S. military training exercise, called Cobra Gold, is the
largest military training exercise in Southeast Asia. The other ASEAN countries
participate in Cobra Gold as observers (Ebata, 1994b). The Royal Thai Armed Forces
also have promoted bilateral military training exercises with Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Singapore (see Figure 2) and have asserted intra-ASEAN multi-military training
exercises (Ebata, 1994b).
Vietnam
Vietnamese military troop numbers were greatly diminished during the early
1990s. According to The Military Balance, Vietnam had approximately 1,249,000
military personnel during 1989 and 1990 but decreased to 572,000 during 1994 and
1995. In addition, weaponry of the Vietnamese forces has not changed since the end of
the Vietnam War. Increasing troop mobility and weapon modernization are serious
issues for the Vietnamese forces. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
estimated that Vietnam spent only six million dollars to purchase weapons between
1987 and 1991. Their defense budget was smaller than the other Southeast Asian
countries (Ebata, 1994b).
Although the Vietnam Army personnel numbers have decreased dramatically, the
Army is still the core of the Vietnam forces (see Figure 3). The Infantry, consisting of
fifty divisions, dominates the Army (The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
1994). They form only three mechanized divisions in the Army. Although the Army
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possesses 1,300 heavy/middle battle tanks and 2,300 artillery pieces, its transportation
ability is poor (see Figure 6).
Vietnam's Navy and Air Force weaponry has become decrepit. Five Petya-11
frigates are the main battleships of the Vietnam Navy; however, it is unknown whether
these frigates are operational. The other two ex-U.S. frigates were built during the
1940s. The Air Force possessed 382 fighter and fighter/ground attack jets in 1989 but
inventory decreased to 190 by 1995 (see Figure 8). The main combat aircraft are 125
MIG-21 Fishbeds but many of them are considered unusable (Ebata, 1994b).
Vietnam kept its military ties with the former Soviet Union (Russia). Although
reduced, the number of the Russian forces in Cam Ranh Bay is still there. The Soviet
Union established large air and naval bases in Cam Ranh bay during the 1980s and they
stationed approximately 4,000 to 7,000 military personnel there. After the Cold war
ended, approximately 1,000 Russians occupied the military bases in 1992 (Ebata,
1994b).
Conclusion
The ASEAN countries have promoted modernization of their armed forces since
the 1980s.

Introduction of new combat aircraft is a main component of the

modernization effort. F-5s and A-4s are common fighter jets and fighter/ground
attackers among the ASEAN armed forces except Vietnam. The ASEAN countries
purchased F-5s and A-4s from the 1960s to the 1980s.

These countries have

modernized combat aircraft and/or have purchased more sophisticated combat aircraft.
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand began to purchase new, more
advanced combat aircraft such as British Hawks, the U.S. F-16s and F-18s, and
Russian MIG-29s during the late 1980s. On the other hand, poor economic conditions
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impede some ASEAN countries, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, who do not have
sufficient budgets to purchase new combat aircraft.
Navies of the ASEAN countries have equipped their warships with anti-ship
missiles and/or have purchased missile ships. Especially the Indonesian and Thai
Navies are greatly expanding their capabilities. The number of Indonesian naval ships
will double during the mid 1990s and Thailand intends to operate an aircraft carrier
during the late 1990s.
Although armies dominate in most of the armed forces of the ASEAN countries,
the sizes of the armies are either stable or decreasing. The number of personnel in the
Vietnamese Army has decreased to less than half during the past five years. After the
Cold War, ASEAN member countries prefer to have more mobile, mechanized armies
instead of many troops.
The structure of armed forces among the ASEAN countries shifted to preparing
for modem conventional warfare from countering insurgency. Some scholars see this
structural change as military modernization. Other scholars speculate that the countries
are involved in a Southeast Asian arms race.
On the other hand, the ASEAN countries have strengthened their military
cooperation. Some ASEAN countries have established joint exercise training ranges
and their forces train and test weapons together. lntra-ASEAN bilateral military
training exercises often standardized military commands and strategies. Moreover,
their attitudes are effective in building security cooperation and decreasing mutual
suspicion among the ASEAN countries.

CHAPTER V
DEFENSIVE MEASURES IN THE ASEAN STATES:
USEFUL OR FUTILE?
Expansion of Defense Expenditures Among the ASEAN Countries
Most of the ASEAN countries are currently expanding their defense
expenditures. According to the Research Institute for Peace and Security (1994) in
Tokyo, three internal and external elements promoted expanding their defense budgets:
(1) Preeminent economic growth of these countries sustained expansion of their
defense budgets, (2) they purchased advanced and expensive weaponry to prepare for
conventional warfare, and (3) defense industries targeted Southeast Asian countries as
promising weapon markets.
Some scholars and journalists argued that the effect of the current arms
expansion in this region has been to cause an arms race. However, the heads of the
armed forces among the ASEAN countries denied the presence of the arms race. The
military leaders provided reasons for expanding their defense budgets, and denied
military competition with neighboring countries. The claim was that only the economic
growth of these countries had promoted modernization of weaponry. This chapter
addresses the relationship between the economy and defense expenditures among the
ASEAN countries.
Fear of an Arms Race
ASEAN countries, especially the Philippines and Vietnam, were concerned
about the appearance of an arms race because "it is difficult to escape the general
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conclusion that a highly militarized economy will tend to be a structurally impaired,
lethargic, and possibly a declining economy" (Nincic, 1982, p. 54).
The Gulf War showed that expensive high-tech weaponry is required to be
prepared for modern conventional warfare. Technologically sophisticated weaponry is
profoundly expensive. For example, the price of a New Zealand A-4 fighter jet, first
produced in 1956, is 4.6 million dollars compared to an F-16, first produced in 1978,
priced at 28 million dollars (Ebata, 1994b). Because sophisticated weapon systems are
so costly, arms building obstructs a government from allotting budget monies to other
sectors. In addition, weapons and military personnel are not productive. For example,
a truck can transport materials that reinforce economic growth; however, a battle tank is
used only for warfare. Arms competitions require expensive advanced weapons that do
not contribute to economic growth activities (Shindo, 1988). Although the Armed
Forces do protect economic and social structures of the ASEAN countries, an arms race
could obstruct their economic growth.
Evaluating Defense Expenditures
A common way to evaluate arms building is by defining and comparing defense
budgets of individual countries. Because of different currencies used in different
countries, they commonly evaluate defense budgets in two ways (Ebata, 1994a). One
evaluates quantities of defense budgets by a hard currency such as the U.S. dollar.
Usually, when developing countries purchase weapons from international weapon
markets, hard currencies are used for the payment. Therefore, specific hard currencies
are good measures of the defense budgets. The second method evaluates expenditures
of defense budgets as shares of the gross domestic product (GDP). Because there is no
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standardized way to calculate the GNP, usually GDP is used to evaluate individual
defense budgets.
Evaluating Defense Expenditures Among ASEAN Countries
This analysis relies on data produced from The Government Finance Statistics
Yearbook 1994 published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Because of the
reliability of the data, the International Institute for Strategic Studies uses the data to
produce its annual report, The Military Balance.

This analysis mainly examines

defense expenditures of the ASEAN countries, excepting Brunei and Vietnam, because
IMF does not have sufficient financial data on them.
GDP among most of the ASEAN countries grew significantly in the late 1980s
and early 1990s (see Figures 9 and 10). Although their economy recessed during the
early and mid 1980s, real annual GDP growth rates of these countries recorded around
a 10% increase in 1987. Singapore and Thailand recorded an approximately 15%
GDP growth rate in 1988. Not only GDP, but also government expenditures of these
countries have increased since the end of the 1980s (see Figure 11). Although the
Philippine economy grew negatively after 1988, the government has expanded its total
expenditures. Moreover, Singapore's government nearly tripled its total expenditures
between 1986 and 1992.

On the other hand, Indonesian, Malaysian, and Thai

governments held to modest growth of their expenditures.
When we compare growth of the GDP of the ASEAN countries to their military
expenditures, we note a clear relationship. Not only the total expenditures but also
military expenditures of these countries have increased since the end of the 1980s (see
Figures 11 and 12). These defense expenditures, except Indonesia, approximately
doubled between the mid 1980s and the early 1990s. On the other hand, the weak
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Vietnamese economy seriously influenced its defense expenditures. Vietnam recorded
more than a 1,000% inflation rate during the end of the 1980s. The Vietnamese
government decreased its defense expenditure to a level below that of Brunei in 1993.
The defense expenditures of Brunei were approximately one-third of the Philippines.
This was the smallest defense budget among the ASEAN members (International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994).
Singapore and Thailand (to a lesser degree) had larger military budgets as shares
of their GDPs than did the other ASEAN countries (see Figure 13). Indonesia and
Thailand have much larger GDPs than the other ASEAN countries (see Figure 9). The
GDPs of Indonesia and Thailand each rose to more than one hundred billion U.S.
dollars in 1992. The GDPs of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore were about
half Thailand's and Indonesia's GDPs. The GDPs of Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Singapore were similar; however, the sizes of their military budgets are clearly different
(see Figure 12). Although the total government expenditure of the Philippines is larger
than that of Singapore, the defense budget of the Philippines was almost half that of
Singapore's (see Figures 11 and 12). Figures 13 and 14 show that Singapore and
Thailand emphasized their defense sectors more than the other countries.

Both

countries have spent approximately 20% of the total government expenditures on
defense.
Defense expenditures of the ASEAN countries have expanded since the end of
the 1980s, except in Brunei and Vietnam; however, these expenditures as shares of
GDP and total expenditures have remained stable or decreased. Indonesia, Singapore,
and Thailand decreased their defense expenditures as shares of their GDPs since the
mid 1980s. The defense expenditures as shares of the total government expenditures
are almost stable in this period.
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Figure 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14 rely on the data of the below sources.
International Monetary Fund. (1994). Government Finance Statistics
Ye arbook 1994. Washington, DC: International Mone tary Fund
Publications Services, pp. 350-622.
Okabe, T. (1989). ASEAN ni okeru kokumin tougou to chiki tougou
[National and regional integration in ASEAN]. Tokyo: Kokusai Mondai
Kenkyu-syo, p. 175.
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Conclusion
The economic growth of the ASEAN countries allowed for expansion of their
defense budgets. The ASEAN members, especially the Philippines, Singapore, and
Vietnam, were concerned that their defense attitudes could cause arms races. If an arms
race should occur in ASEAN, tensions among the rriember countries could increase.
The tensions would threaten the security of the smaller countries, such as Singapore,
more than the larger countries.
Fortunately, arms expansion in ASEAN has not caused an arms race and their
attitudes are distinguishable from those in the Middle East where arms races did occur
(Ebata, 1994b). If these countries continue their arms expansion within the limitations
of their rates of economic growth, that expansion should not cause an arms race
(Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1994).
In fact, the ASEAN countries have carefully expanded their defense budgets so
they will not obstruct their economic growth. Vietnam, a Southeast Asian power, kept
more than one million military personnel during the 1980s; however, the size of the
Vietnamese forces coincidentally decreased with its shrinking economy during the early
1990s.

Economically-hindered ASEAN countries, such as Vietnam and the

Philippines, preferred economic reform to modernization of their armed forces. Both
countries are concerned that an arms race in this region would obstruct their economic
growth (Ebata, 1994b).
An arms race is a serious threat to the economy of the ASEAN countries. These
countries have modernized their armed forces while maintaining a balance between
arms building and economic growth.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Evolution of Regional Cooperation
Intra-ASEAN conflicts were serious issues of ASEAN until the 1970s.
Southeast Asian colonies became independent after World War II; however, ethnic,
religious, and ideological conflicts (generated during the colonial era) obstructed nation
building and national integration of these countries. Moreover, these conflicts crossed
over boundaries, critically influencing diplomatic relations among these countries. In
this awkward regional setting, Southeast Asian countries were potential enemies of
neighboring countries. Although national security was a serious problem for these
countries, they did not possess sufficient defense capabilities until the 1970s. Former
suzerain states, Britain and the United States, responded to security issues of Brunei,
Malaya, Singapore, and the Philippines, which lacked the capability to defend
themselves. On the other hand, some Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines
and Thailand tried to promote national security through regional cooperation. As a
result, the Association of Southeast Asia and Maphilindo were formed in the early
1960s but collapsed because of conflicts between member countries. The member
countries did not have enough common goals and would not cooperate with each other.
When ASEAN was established in 1967, some observers questioned whether the
regional organization would be maintained. However, ASEAN succeeded in keeping
cooperation among the members. Communist countries denounced ASEAN as 'the son
of SEATO' under the Cold War frame but ASEAN denied it was a political and
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anti-communist organization so as to not arouse the Eastern bloc. The member
countries strengthened intra-ASEAN political cooperation and promoted economic
growth. They managed regional conflicts through the ASEAN meetings and the
peaceful coexistence of ASEAN countries began.
The Cold War framework began to collapse in Southeast Asia after the British
and U.S. forces withdrew from Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and South Vietnam in
the early 1970s. Three Indochinese states, Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam, were
communized by 1975.

In 1978 Vietnam invaded and occupied Cambodia. No

external ASEAN countries militarily intervened in the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia, but they did strengthen their political and military cooperation to protect
themselves from Vietnamese aggression. Vietnam occupied Cambodia through the
1980s and a regional cold war between ASEAN and Vietnam emerged. The ASEAN
Concord was produced in 1976 to show firm political ties between the member
countries, and the regional organization was presented as having its focus on political
cooperation. In addition, member countries increased their armed forces and bilateral
military exercises.
Collapse of the East-West ideological conflict during the late 1980s led to
withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.· Vietnam announced withdrawal
of its troops from Cambodia in 1989. By 1991 complete troop withdrawal had been
accomplished. Significantly, the ASEAN countries reconciled with Vietnam and
allowed it to participate in ASEAN in 1995. The cold war between the ASEAN
countries and Vietnam was over and Vietnam became "'one student' of ASEAN's
political and economic success" (Simon, 1994, p. 187). Although the Vietnamese
threat greatly diminished, member countries continued their political cooperation.

99
Moreover, ASEAN increased its capability for regional security as one of the few
successful political organizations in the third world.
ASEAN Countries in the Post-Cambodia Era
The ASEAN countries have strengthened their political and military ties "in the
so-called post-Cambodia era" (Acharya, 1991, p. 175). Although the Cold War is
over, ethnic and religious conflicts still exist in and among the ASEAN countries.
These conflicts could lead to armed disputes in this region.
After the Cold War frame collapsed, ethnic and religious conflicts caused brutal
disputes in the former Eastern bloc. For example, Bosnian Croats, Muslims, and
Serbs fought each other in Bosnia Herzegovina and 150,(X)() to 300,(X)() people were
killed (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1994). Warfare in former
Soviet Union states such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya, and Georgia was also
caused by rising ethnic nationalism.
Plural societies in the ASEAN countries have been the cause of regional
disputes. Some scholars and journalists were concerned that cooperation among the
ASEAN countries had weakened and ethnic and religious conflicts within this region
would escalate at the end of the Cold War. However, in reality, these member
countries kept healthy ties and their stable relationships contributed to their economic
growth.
ASEAN has actively taken the initiative to manage regional security issues in the
post-Cambodia era and established the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994. The
purposes of this regional forum are (a) to keep the U.S. military presence in this
region, (b) to draw China into the forum and to respond to its expansionism, and (c) to
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maintain regional stability by balancing the influence of China, Japan, Russia, and the
United States (Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1994).
Two regional issues at the first ARF meeting were the instability of Cambodia
and the Chinese threat. Although a Cambodian national election was held under UN
control in 1993, the Cambodian National Unity Party, launched by the Khmer Rouge,
boycotted the ·election. In 1994, the new Cambodian regime still conflicted with the
Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot. Cambodian delegates to the first ARF meeting
demanded the other countries' military support to defeat the communist guerrilla force.
The other participants were anxious to provide Cambodia with arms and training
(Tasker, 1994).
Participants of the first ARF meeting, including China, discussed territorial
issues in the South China Sea. The Chinese threat has been a traditional regional
security issue. The ASEAN countries (except Singapore) traditionally have not treated
Chinese immigrants warmly in their countries. These countries worried that China's
expanding dominance in Southeast Asia would allow economically successful Chinese
citizens to amass political power in these countries. In addition, China has expanded its
hegemony in the South China Sea since 1970s.

The Soviet and U.S. forces at the

edge of the South China Sea did not intervene in the battles of Spratly and Paracel
Islands during the 1970s and 1980s. National leaders among the ASEAN countries
recognized that China was intent on expansionism and China's attitude has not changed
even after the Cold War.
On the other hand, the ASEAN countries have modernized their armed forces
within the limitations of their economic growth and have strengthened security ties with
neighboring countries. They have built up their air and naval capabilities and purchased
new combat aircraft and missile ships. Armaments expansion can be a factor
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promoting regional instability. In contrast, intra-ASEAN bilateral exercises have
promoted security cooperation among the ASEAN members. After the dominant
Russian and U.S. forces withdrew from Southeast Asia in the early 1990s, the ASEAN
countries expanded their bilateral exercises to multilateral ones. Moreover, some
members constructed military exercise grounds or weapon test ranges in their territories
for joint use of the ASEAN countries. Although the ASEAN members are concerned
with the decreasing U.S. military presence in this region after the Cold War, they retain
regional cooperation and possess the confidence to manage regional conflicts through
the frame of ASEAN.
Usefulness and Limitations of ASEAN and Its Future
An important function of ASEAN member states is to be a permanent diplomatic
channel with mediators to solve regional issues. This is a respectable direction in
which ASEAN should continuously move in the future. Diplomatic contacts among the
ASEAN countries have increased within the frame of the organization; while mutual
suspicion has decreased. ASEAN has worked as a regional communication channel,
thus helping to keep regional conflicts from escalating into armed disputes.
In addition, ASEAN works as a non-aggression system for its members. The
ASEAN countries have mutually restricted the use of armed forces to solve regional
issues and have promoted intra-ASEAN political cooperation. Although some
members broke off diplomatic relations with other members, they did not resort to
armed force to resolve their problems. As a result, the newly independent ASEAN
countries could use their resources to build nations with regional stability while
concentrating on economic development. The ASEAN countries developed common
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national interests within the framework of ASEAN, enjoying peaceful coexistence and
economic growth.
Although ASEAN can be an important regional actor in Southeast Asia, its
capability is still limited. ASEAN forms no supranational body and has no compulsory
authority. The ASEAN countries asserted that ASEAN was just an association of
nation-states or a group of ASEAN countries (Antolik, 1990, & Hagiwara, 1990). In
fact, these ASEAN countries did not submit parts of their sovereignties to the frame of
ASEAN. In contrast the European Community (EC) is a supranational body. EC
formed a "'government'-like structure with legislative, executive, and judicial
branches" (Rourke, 1993). The advanced regional organization evolved to the
European Union (EU) in 1991. Its member countries decided to abolish passport
control at the borders and to produce the EU currency by 1999. ASEAN is represented
by the ASEAN summit meeting and other ministerial meetings. Consensus is required
among the ASEAN heads of government, therefore the ASEAN Secretariat does not
direct ASEAN and does not possess independent power, which remains with the
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Broinowski, 1982, & Yamakage, 1991). Mutual
cooperation among the ASEAN members was built into the organization; however,
cooperation does not imply that all issues are submitted to ASEAN for resolution.
ASEAN is still a weak alliance papering over differences among its members.
Mutual respect for the sovereignty of all members and nonintervention in the
domestic affairs of the member countries are principles of ASEAN. However, these
principles have produced weaknesses of ASEAN and it does not manage issues that
involve sensitive subjects of sovereignty among the ASEAN countries.
For example, ASEAN should have managed issues of human rights and the
environment, but it did not do so. ASEAN assumed a conservative attitude in the
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infringement of human rights in East Timor. Timor is an island in Southeast Indonesia.
The Eastern part of the island had been a Portuguese colony. When East Timor
declared its independence in 1975, Indonesian forces invaded and annexed it.
Approximately 100,000 to 200,000 citizens in East Timor were killed by Indonesian
forces or starved to death (Kiriyama, 1994). However, ASEAN did not respond to this
issue because the East Timor issue was considered a domestic issue by the Indonesian
government. ASEAN was reluctant to intervene in such a sensitive issue related to the
sovereignty of Indonesia.
In another example, foreign timber industries have devastated the rain forests of
Southeast Asia. Citizens living in rain forest areas profited from the forest but lost tbeir
income and habitat by the commercial cutting of the trees (Kawai, 1994). Environment
and humanitarian NGOs criticized the activities of multinational timber corporations and
governments; however, ASEAN has not responded to these issues either. These issues
were also "domestic issues" of the ASEAN countries. Moreover, ASEAN promotes
economic development generally and ignores managing environmental and
humanitarian issues.
Moreover, intra-ASEAN economic competitions and conflicts shows the limited
capability of ASEAN. Although economic issues became more important subjects in
ASEAN, it could not manage these issues effectively. Economic cooperation among
the ASEAN countries is still modest. Intra-ASEAN trade is meek compared with trade
between the ASEAN countries and Japan or the United States. In addition, the
horizontal division of labor in ASEAN did not show any significant progress because
these countries emphasized growth of their industries more than their economic
cooperation.

Moreover, less industrialized ASEAN members were concerned that

advanced industrialized member countries would develop their industries much more.
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For example, Singapore's rapidly progressing industries caused economic problems
that threatened other ASEAN countries. The economic interests of ASEAN countries
often conflict with one another, making it more difficult to achieve consensus at
ASEAN meetings.
In the area of regional security issues, China is an emerging threat to which
ASEAN may have to respond. However, on the basis of its history and geopolitics,
ASEAN will not be able to deal with China's emergence as a global power in the years
ahead. China possesses a significantly more capable armed force compared to any
ASEAN country. However, ASEAN will not be a military alliance to oppose the
Chinese military power because its member countries do not want a specific member
country to lead the alliance, which could create an inequality in its membership. While
there are few possibilities for establishing an ASEAN mutual security treaty, the
Chinese threat nevertheless unifies the member countries.
Moreover, the Chinese issue is more a complicated subject for the ASEAN
countries than the Vietnamese threat was during the Cold War era. Economic
development is a common national goal of the ASEAN countries and China negatively
and positively influences accomplishment of their goal. First, energy is a key element
in promoting economic development. The Chinese government has claimed its
territorial rights in the South China Sea and has threatened to use military force against
the ASEAN countries if they move aggressively in this region. Most important, the
region contains huge oil deposits. Second, and paradoxically, China is not only a
threat to these countries but also a big market for them. The market is another key to
economic development of the ASEAN countries. As a result, ASEAN members are
reluctant to cooperate with each other in producing a coherent unified opposition against
the Chinese threat.
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The external and internal communist threat was a common issue among the
ASEAN countries, so they produced coherent anti-Vietnam policies during the 1970s
and 1980s. Although China is a common threat to the ASEAN countries, its market is
a benefit to them. The territorial issue of the South China Sea is a serious regional
issue but not an issue for all ASEAN countries. Moreover, the Chinese market will
benefit the ASEAN countries. The Chinese threat and market needs are differently
perceived by each member country. It is difficult to expect that ASEAN, when failing
to treat conflicting internal economic interests, will manage more complicated security
and economic relationships between them and China.
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